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ABSTRACT:
In the employer-sponsored insurance market that covers most Americans;
many workers are “underinsured.” The evidence shows onerous out-of-pocket
payments causing them to forgo needed care, miss work, and fall into
bankruptcies and foreclosures. Nonetheless, many higher-paid workers are
“overinsured”: the evidence shows that in this domain, surplus insurance
stimulates spending and price inflation without improving health. Employers can
solve these problems together by scaling cost-sharing to wages. This reform
would make insurance better protect against risk and guarantee access to care,
while maintaining or even reducing insurance premiums.
Yet, there are legal obstacles to scaled cost-sharing. The group-based nature
of employer health insurance, reinforced by federal law, makes it difficult for
scaling to be achieved through individual choices. The Affordable Care Act’s
(ACA) “essential coverage” mandate also caps cost-sharing even for wealthy
workers that need no such cap. Additionally, there is a tax distortion in favor of
highly paid workers purchasing healthcare through insurance rather than out-ofpocket. These problems are all surmountable. In particular, the ACA has
expanded the applicability of an unenforced employee-benefits rule that prohibits
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“discrimination” in favor of highly compensated workers. A novel analysis
shows that this statute gives the Internal Revenue Service the authority to require
scaling and to thereby eliminate the current inequities and inefficiencies caused
by the tax distortion. The promise is smarter insurance for over 150 million
Americans.
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INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) has primarily focused on expanding access
to health insurance, but it is time to look more closely at whether insurance is
achieving its core purposes: to protect individuals from risk and to ensure access
to healthcare when needed. 1 Can health insurance better serve those purposes,
and can it do so without wastefully stimulating healthcare spending?
This Article will focus on the employer-sponsored health insurance market,
where most Americans are covered and will continue to be covered under the
ACA. 2 Health insurance premiums are said to be a drag on corporate profits and
global competitiveness. 3 Still, much of the costs of health insurance premiums
are passed on to workers as a substitute for wages. 4 Thus, “the increasing cost of
health care has resulted in relatively flat real wages for 30 years.” 5
In the United States, cost-sharing has become the primary mechanism for
reducing insurance expenditures and, by extension, maintaining affordable

1. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (2010) (discussing health
promotion, financial security, and brute luck theories). See generally D.M. Cutler & R. J.
Zeckhauser, The Anatomy of Health Insurance, in 1 HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 563 (A.J.
Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000) (arguing for health insurance as a protector of economic
security). For a classic economic approach to insurance, see Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The
Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 295 (1948) (discussing risk and
insurance in relation to income).
2. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H (West 2014) (employer mandate under the ACA); CBO’s
February 2013 Estimate of the Effects of the Affordable Care Act on Health Insurance Coverage,
CBO (Feb 2013), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2013-02ACA.pdf (projecting that as a result of the ACA, by 2023 employers sponsored coverage for 167
million non-elderly people, out of 288 million total, or 58%). But see Suja A. Thomas & Peter
Molk, Employer Costs and Conflicts Under the Affordable Care Act, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE
56 (2013) (discussing problems in the employer mandate).
3. See generally Toni Johnson, Healthcare Costs and U.S. Competitiveness, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(Mar.
2010),
http://www.cfr.org/competitiveness/healthcare-costs-uscompetitiveness/p13325.
4. See Katherine Swartz, Revising Employers’ Role in Sponsoring and Financing Health
Insurance/Medical Care, in A FUTURE OF GOOD JOBS? AMERICA’S CHALLENGE IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 86 (Timothy J. Bartik & Susan N. Houseman eds., 2008) (“Depending on the
circumstances, workers, companies, consumers, and company stockholders all pay varying shares
of the costs.”).
5. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Victor R. Fuchs, Who Really Pays for Health Care? The Myth of
“Shared Responsibility,” 299 JAMA 1057, 1058 (2008). See also VICTOR FUCHS, WHO SHALL
LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE 127–28 (1993) (“[T]he public must pay for care
under any system of finance . . . the ultimate cost falls on families and individuals even when the
payment mechanism makes it appear that the bills are being sent elsewhere.”); William M. Sage,
Should the Patient Conquer?, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 101, 103 (2010) (“We seem finally to have
reached the point at which spending more on health care means denying our other material
needs.”).
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coverage. 6 Cost-sharing involves patients making various out-of-pocket (OOP)
payments (or “user fees”) including deductibles, copays, coinsurance, and
reference prices. 7
However, because cost-sharing exposure is in effect the absence of insurance
for those expenses, cost-sharing can undermine the primary function of
insurance. When cost-sharing exposure is too large, the beneficiary is no longer
guaranteed access to the healthcare that she needs, or may only be able to secure
access by reallocating from other necessities. This could trigger bankruptcy or
home foreclosure. To protect the beneficiary against such risks, the insurance
policy caps the annual out-of-pocket exposure: this “catastrophic limit” is the
maximum exposure to uninsured risk, beyond which the individual enjoys full
insurance.
Such a cap is anathema for cost control, however. Individuals rarely need
extensive healthcare services. The vast majority of health spending is consumed
by a few unpredictable people who account for tens of thousands of dollars of
healthcare in a given year. 8 Thus, the cap deprives the insurer of its primary costcontrol mechanism at precisely the point where the expenditure decisions are
most impactful on aggregate costs.
The two goals for a rational health insurance policy are thus in “inherent
tension.” 9 Too high a cap hinders risk protection. Too low a cap hinders costcontrol.
A significant problem has been largely ignored in health insurance design,
especially in the development of cost-sharing models. Namely, individuals have
6. See generally Employer Health Benefits: 2012 Annual Survey, KAISER FAM. FOUND. &
HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TR. (2012) [hereinafter Employer Health Benefits 2012],
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8345-employer-health-benefits-annualsurvey-full-report-0912.pdf (showing the prevalence of this strategy). See also MARK A. HALL,
MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS: THE LAW, ETHICS & ECONOMICS OF RATIONING
MECHANISMS 3–6 (1997) (explaining that some form of rationing is inevitable); Clark C.
Havighurst, Prospective Self-Denial: Can Consumers Contract Today to Accept Health Care
Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1758 (1992) (same).
7. See infra Section I.A.
8. Cf. Steven B. Cohen & William Yu, The Concentration and Persistence in the Level of
Health Expenditures Over Time: Estimates for the U.S. Population, 2008–2009, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY 1, (Statistical Brief #354, Jan. 2012),
http://meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st354/stat354.pdf.
9. Katherine Swartz, Cost-Sharing: Effects on Spending and Outcomes, ROBERT WOOD
JOHNSON
FOUND.
1
(Res.
Synthesis
Rep.
No.
20,
Dec.
2010),
http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2010/rwjf402103/subassets/rwjf402103
_1. See also James C. Robinson, Insurers’ Strategies for Managing the Use and Cost of
Biopharmaceuticals, 25 HEALTH AFF.. 1205, 1215 (2006) (“Benefit designs emphasizing consumer
cost sharing are both too effective, pushing some patients to the brink of bankruptcy, and
insufficiently effective, since a large fraction of total biopharmaceutical costs are incurred by
patients who already have spent through their deductibles and annual payment limits.”).
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radically different abilities to bear risk. For instance, those in the top quintile are
paid five times more than those in the bottom quintile. 10 And income is an
accepted proxy for the ability to bear financial risk. Yet, within a given health
plan, they all have the same cost-sharing burdens. Accordingly, the cap will be
too high for some beneficiaries, making them “underinsured.” 11 The same cap
will be too low for other beneficiaries, removing the price signal sooner than
necessary and making them “overinsured.” 12 A one-size-fits-all approach sets a
cost-sharing limit that is arbitrary for each individual. It is untethered to its riskprotection purpose.
As a few scholars and firms have begun to realize, the optimal insurance
policy will instead be one that scales the cost-sharing burdens for each
beneficiary to his or her ability to bear that uninsured risk. 13 Scaled cost-sharing
(SCS) is feasible in a world where employers pay wages and provide health
insurance; the two data points need only be linked together. One imperfect but
feasible mechanism for such tailoring would look like the following: instead of
exposing all beneficiaries to the same fixed dollar amount of uninsured risk per
year, the insurer would expose all beneficiaries to the same percent of their
wages as the uninsured risk. For example, we could use as a baseline a common
cost-sharing profile that includes a $3,000 cost-sharing cap, and apply it to a
median American worker with a $50,000 income. This median worker with an
average plan faces a 6% cost-sharing ratio. We could then apply that same 6%
ratio across the board, scaling the absolute cost-sharing amount upwards and
downwards with each person’s income. In this arrangement, each beneficiary
gets roughly the protection from risk that she needs, while also continuing to
have as much skin in the game as she can handle.
There are normative reasons for scaling health insurance risk to wages that
track the general purposes of health insurance: fairness and access to needed
care. 14 The current mechanism of using unscaled cost-sharing thresholds is
regressive in application. We would not tolerate this type of regressivity if the
cost-sharing burdens were conceived as taxes. Nonetheless, in a time when
employer-sponsored insurance coverage is mandated and subsidized by the
federal government, such an analogy may be apt. More generally, proper
implementation of SCS also blunts some of the most trenchant normative
objections to cost-sharing, such as those levied by luck egalitarians. 15 This
Article will argue that ability-to-pay should be the overriding criterion for
10. See infra Figure 1.
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. See infra Section I.C.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See infra text accompanying note 102 (defining and discussing luck egalitarianism).
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normative evaluation of health insurance mechanisms.
This is not a zero-sum reform. SCS should also appeal to rational employers
who seek to maximize shareholder value. 16 Since the distribution of American
workers’ incomes is concentrated in favor of the highly compensated,
proportional income-scaling will also be asymmetric, adding four times more
cost-sharing than it removes, thereby significantly reducing the aggregate burden
of insurance premiums. 17 SCS is also unique among “consumer-directed health
insurance” reforms in that it targets high-cost healthcare, which accounts for the
bulk of overall spending. Thus, SCS could significantly reduce insurance outlays
in this second respect. Moreover, SCS promises to deliver better health outcomes
and enhanced worker productivity for each dollar spent on health insurance. 18 For
these reasons, SCS may allow a greater bargaining surplus between workers and
shareholders.
After conducting a normative and economic analysis of this reform,
including a review of the scant precedents in scholarship, the market, and federal
law, this Article investigates the question of why employers have not widely
adopted wage-scaled cost-sharing. In particular, this Article engages in legal
analysis to explore and solve four potential sources of market failure.
First, one might wonder why a choice-based system, in which workers
would select their own cost-sharing profiles and pay insurance premiums
accordingly, has not emerged. Car and home insurance often already operate in
this fashion. 19 The longstanding practice of employers subsidizing health
insurance and the legal limits on individual-rating of premiums present obstacles
to this approach. In this domain, choice also presents problems of adverse
selection by allowing beneficiaries to exploit their private information, which
undermines the risk-pooling function of insurance. More generally, a choicebased mechanism could be compromised by the severe cognitive limits that
individuals face when making such complex decisions about risk. As a result,
greater intervention by employers and regulators may be sensible in this domain;
they could move toward scaling while holding constant the lack of choice that
exists under the status quo. Nonetheless, as an intermediate step, employers could
implement scaling as a default rule.
A second significant obstacle is that well-intentioned caps on cost-sharing in
the ACA limit the potential application of SCS. 20 This is an unfortunate flaw in
the ACA, but the executive and legislative branches have fixes at their disposal.
Even without such reforms, employers have considerable discretion to use
16. See infra Section II.B.
17. See infra Table 1.
18. See infra Section II.C.
19. See infra Section III.A.
20. See infra Section III.B.
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scaling beneath those statutory caps.
Third, there may be an agency problem. Managers responsible for designing
the firm’s insurance policy are paid more than the median worker, which may
cause them to reject SCS even if it would improve profits for the shareholders. 21
There is a related collective action problem in the market for talented workers.
Employers are hesitant to be the first to impose higher cost-sharing burdens on
their highest-paid workers, lest they lose them. Fundamentally, these problems
are caused by the tax code, which creates a distortion in favor of health spending
through insurance. This distortion is especially pronounced for high-paid
workers.
Fourth, there may be misperceptions that current federal law prohibits this
sort of “discrimination” by salary levels. 22 This Article’s analysis reveals that the
law is actually permissive. Indeed, it obliges employers to use scaling in order to
allow lower-paid workers to get the full benefit of their health insurance without
hiding tax-free compensation for top workers in the form of unnecessary
insurance. Thanks to an expansion of this unenforced rule in the ACA, the IRS
now has a legal mechanism to counteract the distortion of the tax preference. It
need only clarify its regulations to require scaled cost-sharing. Accordingly,
congressional action is unnecessary for this landmark reform. IRS action alone
could better substantiate health insurance’s goals and reduce its distortive effects
on consumption. Scaled cost-sharing is smarter insurance.
I. COST-SHARING AND ITS LIMITS
A. Three Zones of Insurance
As a patient’s spending on healthcare grows month by month in any given
year, she moves through three different “zones” of insurance, from no insurance,
to partial insurance, and finally to full insurance. These stages correspond to
different features of typical cost-sharing schemes.
• Zone 1 – No Insurance: An annual deductible gives the patient complete
responsibility for the first health expenditures in a year. In other words,
the patient has 100% skin in the game. In PPO plans (Preferred Provider
Organizations, which cover most patients in the USA), three quarters of
beneficiaries have deductibles, and the average annual deductible is less
than $1,000. 23 About one fifth of American workers are in “high
21. See infra Section III.C.
22. See infra Section III.D.
23. Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6, at 2 (showing that 77% of PPO beneficiaries
have deductibles). For the distribution between PPO (Preferred Provider Organization) plans versus
HMOs (Health Maintenance Organization), POS (Point of Service), and HDHP (High Deductible
Health Plan) plans, see id. at 4 exhibit E (showing 56% in PPOs).
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•

•

deductible health plans with a savings option,” and in these plans the
average deductible is a bit over $2,000. 24 This sector has been growing
quickly, more than doubling since 2009. Federal law prohibits highdeductible health plans (HDHPs) from using deductibles above about
$6,000 for individuals or $12,000 for families, but few reach that level
anyway. 25
Zone 2 – Some Insurance: Next, there is a middle range in which patients
have insurance, but must also share the burden of healthcare
consumption through copays, coinsurance, or reference pricing. A copay
is a flat fee paid at a doctor’s office, hospital, or pharmacy. For example,
the average copay for a primary care visit is $23 and $118 for an ER
visit. 26 Coinsurance is a percentage of the service charge (often about
18%) that the health plan demands that the patient reimburse. 27 Under a
“reference price,” an insurer pays a fixed amount for a service and the
beneficiary pays all charges above that fixed amount. 28
Zone 3 – Full Insurance: Finally, there is a zone in which patients have
no skin in the game. “Eighty-seven percent of covered workers have an
out-of-pocket maximum for single coverage, but the actual dollar limits
differ considerably.” 29 Most individual workers (59%) have cost-sharing
burdens capped at some amount less than $3,000 per year (or less than
$5,500 for family-coverage). 30 Only 2% of individually covered workers
are exposed to more than $6,000 in costs per year. 31 Nonetheless, even
plans that have identical out-of-pocket limits may vary considerably on
how those limits are applied, making it difficult to generalize across
plans. 32

24. Id. at 2. For the number in HDHPs, see id. at 4 exhibit E (showing 19%).
25. See id. at 127 exhibit 7-31 (showing HDHPs for individuals with only 3% at the level of
$6,000 or more, and 24% over $5,000).
26. Id. at 3.
27. See id. at 121 exhibit 7-21 (showing the 18% figure).
28. See James C. Robinson & Timothy T. Brown, Increases in Consumer Cost Sharing
Redirect Patient Volumes and Reduce Hospital Prices for Orthopedic Surgery, 32 HEALTH AFF.
1392 (2013) (utilizing a natural experiment to assess the impact of reference prices).
29. Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6, at 4–5.
30. See id. at 127 exhibit 7-31 (last row, adding the first two items together: 32% for $1,999 or
less plus 27% for $2000–$2999). For the out-of-pocket (OOP) maximums for family coverage, see
id. at 129 exhibit 7-33 (last row, adding the first three categories, yielding 51% having a maximum
of $5,499 or less).
31. Id.
32. See Karen Pollitz et al., Coverage When It Counts: How Much Protection Does Health
Insurance Offer and How Can Consumers Know?, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, 6
(May
2009).
http://www.americanprogressaction.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/05/pdf
/CoverageWhenItCounts.pdf. The authors surveyed ten insurance policies in Massachusetts and
found that “annual out-of-pocket limits in many policies do not cap all forms of cost sharing.” In a
comparison of two particular plans, the authors note that “[b]oth policies have an annual out-of-
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Overall, in the typical employer-sponsored plan, the employees bear about
18% of the cost of healthcare at the point of consumption; the remaining 82% is
borne by the insurer. 33 But for individual patients, the burden in a given year can
be quite different, making an average figure misleading. Imagine Ms. Mildred
Median, a patient in a plan with a $1,000 deductible, an 18% coinsurance burden,
and a $3,000 cost-sharing maximum (the typical figures on each of these three
modalities). 34 Suppose that this year, Ms. Median will spend tens of thousands of
dollars on a heart stent or a chemo drug, or other high-cost care that, in the
aggregate, accounts for most health spending in the United States. 35 After
spending her $1,000 deductible, Ms. Median will be exposed to up to $2,000
more in costs ($3,000 cap minus the $1,000 deductible). 36 Given her 18%
coinsurance rate, that $2,000 will be consumed after the next $11,111 in
healthcare expenses. 37 Thus, Ms. Median has reached Zone 3, the range of full
insurance with zero skin in the game, after consuming $12,111 in health
expenses, $3,000 of which she paid out of pocket.
For Ms. Median, the cap is a good thing. If she also earns a median family
income of about $51,000, she has now consumed 6% of her income. Depending
on her other obligations, and the amount she has put into savings, Ms. Median
may not have been able to bear more risk. In this sense, the insurance is doing
exactly what it was designed to do.
Even this median level of cost-sharing may be too much for middle-class
Americans. 38 However, let us assume, arguendo, that current median levels of
pocket limit of $5,000. Yet, the breast cancer patient would pay $7,641 in cost sharing under Plan
D and $12,907 in cost sharing under Plan C.”
33. CHRIS PETERSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4049, SETTING AND VALUING HEALTH
INSURANCE BENEFITS (2009) (showing that the typical employer sponsored PPO has an actuarial
value of 80–84%).
34. See supra discussion accompanying notes 23–31.
35. See Cohen & Yu, supra note 8, at 1 (noting that “[i]n both 2008 and 2009, the top 5
percent of the population accounted for nearly 50 percent of health care expenditures” and that
“those individuals ranked in the top 5 percent of the health care expenditure distribution in 2008
[had] a mean expenditure of $35,829”).
36. Most plans count deductible spending towards the OOP maximum, as I do here. See
Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6, at 126 exhibit 7.30 (showing that 15–36% of plans,
depending on type, exclude spending on the deductible for the OOP maximum).
37. The 18% coinsurance rate, multiplied by $11,111 yields $2,000 more in OOP spending.
When added to the $1,000 deductible, the $3,000 cap is reached.
38. See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW ECONOMIC INSECURITY
AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 137–43 (2006) (discussing the economic insecurity
that even middle class Americans face due to healthcare problems). If individuals are suffering
from severe cognitive biases at the point of healthcare consumption, it is also possible that current
cost-sharing levels may over-correct in their function of modifying behavior. See Abigail
Moncrieff, The Individual Mandate as Healthcare Regulation: What the Obama Administration
Should Have Said in NFIB v. Sebelius, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 539 (2013) (arguing that insurance
solves a problem of hyperbolic discounting and optimism).
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cost-sharing are appropriate, so that Ms. Median provides a point of reference.
With that point of reference, we can understand the twin problems of
underinsurance and overinsurance.
FIGURE 1: INCOME QUINTILES FOR U.S., LISTING TYPICAL ANNUAL HEALTH
INSURANCE COST-SHARING MAXIMUMS FOR INDIVIDUALS/FAMILIES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF INCOME 39

39. Author’s calculations are based on U.S. Census Bureau data for 2012 incomes. Carmen
DeNavas-Walt et al., Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2012:
Current Population Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 2013), http://www.census.gov/prod
/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf. The percentages show the cost-sharing maximums ($3,000 for individual
coverage, $5,000 for family coverage) as a proportion of income for the mean household in each
quintile. See Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6. The top 5% of incomes are visually
censored. This graphic is for illustrative purposes. The actual cost-sharing maximum applicable to
individuals varies depending on employers and particular plans, and the distribution of incomes
within a particular employer-based plan is likely to be narrower than shown here.
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B. Underinsurance
Even if manageable for Ms. Median, that same $3,000 in health expenses in
a single year could be devastating for individuals in the lower quintiles of
income. As shown in the Census Bureau data plotted in Figure 1, above, those in
the bottom quintile earn up to about $20,000, less than half of Ms. Median’s
salary. 40 For workers in the middle of that quintile who do not turn to Medicaid
or the health insurance exchanges, a $3,000 outlay would be 26% of income. 41
Even in the next quintile, which may be more typical of the lower-paid but
insured individuals in Ms. Median’s workplace, individuals would have to spend
one of every ten dollars (10% of income) on copays and deductibles. This would
be on top of the taxes and health insurance premiums already paid and the other
expenses that come with illness. 42 If it is coverage for a whole family getting by
on that single income, then the maximum OOP exposure is 19% of income. Even
worse, at the time of a health crisis the family income may actually go down, due
to the worker’s own incapacity or the worker’s need to care for others in the
household who are severely ill.
The individuals in these lower quintiles are likely “underinsured.” In other
words, the cost-sharing burdens are so onerous that they undermine the functions
of insurance: to guarantee access to care and to protect against devastating
financial risk. 43 Determining who precisely qualifies as underinsured raises a
difficult line-drawing problem. 44 But that analytical problem does not make the
practical reality disappear. As one 51-year old mother of two explained, “We’re
all one broken leg, one bad fall, or one case of pneumonia away from the house
of cards completely falling down.” 45
There is an expansive literature on the relationship between medical
problems and financial distress. 46 Even among Americans who were insured all
40. DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 39, at 9. A similar range of wages is found within firms.
41. This article is focusing on employer-sponsored health insurance, but Medicaid also covers
some individuals with very low incomes. See infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
42. See Patricia Ketsche et al., Lower-Income Families Pay a Higher Share of Income Toward
National Health Care Spending than Higher-Income Families Do, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1637, 1640
(2011) (showing that Americans in the bottom quintile of income spend, on average, about 10.2%
of their income on healthcare out of pocket, while those at the top quintile of income spend only
0.9%, even though they consume more healthcare when they get sick).
43. See Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003
and 2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. w298 (2008).
44. However, workable definitions are available. See, e.g., Rashid Bashshur et al., Defining
Underinsurance: A Conceptual Framework for Policy and Empirical Analysis, 50 MED. CARE REV.
199 (1993).
45. Peter J. Cunningham, Carolyn Miller & Alwn Cassil, Living on the Edge: Health Care
Expenses Strain Family Budgets, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE (Res. Brief No. 10,
(Dec. 2008).
46. See e.g., Alison A. Galbraith et al., Nearly Half of Families in High-Deductible Health
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year, one in seven reported spending over 10% of their income on out-of-pocket
medical expenses. Moreover, many insured individuals report difficulty paying
medical bills, changing their way of life to pay medical bills, or being dunned by
collection agencies for medical bills. 47 A national survey and review of court
records found that 62% of bankruptcies had medical causes, including but not
limited to out-of-pocket spending, and that three quarters of those filers had
medical insurance at the start of their illness. 48 Similarly, millions of home
foreclosures have been attributed to medical causes, even for those with health
insurance. 49 These bankruptcies and foreclosures impose externalities on
creditors and neighbors.
This body of research has been controversial, with some scholars
questioning the size of the problem. Some have also characterized causality
determinations as problematic since so many factors may contribute to financial
distress. 50 Nonetheless, that the risk of financial disaster is exacerbated when
exposure to medical costs is out of proportion to a person’s ability to pay those
costs rests on firm analytical footing.
Such a disparity between costs and ability to pay also distorts healthcare
consumption decisions. It is worth remembering that cost-sharing is simply
Plans Whose Members Have Chronic Conditions Face Substantial Financial Burden, 30 HEALTH
AFF. 322, 327 (2011) (finding that “lower income was significantly associated with greater
financial burden” due to cost-sharing).
47. Schoen et al., supra note 43, at w301 exhibit 1 (13.5% paid over 10% of income in 2007);
id. at w304 exhibit 4 (45% of underinsured and 21% of otherwise insured individuals had one of
the listed problems with medical bills).
48. See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein et al. Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007:
Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED., 741, 744–45 (2009); see also Tal Gross & Matthew J.
Notowidigdo, Health Insurance and the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision: Evidence from
Expansions of Medicaid, 95 J. PUB. ECON. 767 (2011) (finding through a quasi-experimental study
that out-of-pocket medical costs roughly account for 26% of personal bankruptcies among lowincome households).
49. Christopher Tarver Robertson et al., Get Sick, Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home
Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 90–94 (2008) (finding that more than half of foreclosures
had medical causes; respondents in foreclosure who enjoyed health insurance paid an average of
$5,100 in out-of-pocket medical bills in the recent two years). See also Craig Pollack, A CaseControl Study of Home Foreclosure, Health Conditions, and Health Care Utilization, 88 J. URB.
HEALTH 469 (2011) (finding an association between medical utilization and foreclosure, while
finding insurance status to be comparable across cases and controls).
50. See Robertson, supra note 49, at 68, 97 (describing a “perfect storm” of factors conspiring
to induce medical foreclosures); Edward R. Morrison et al., Health and Financial Fragility:
Evidence from Car Crashes and Consumer Bankruptcy (Univ. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 655, 2d series, Oct. 2013), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi
/viewcontent.cgi?article=1657&context=law_and_economics (reviewing the literature and
performing a differences-in-differences analyses comparing car accidents, medical bills, and
bankruptcy filings in one state, and finding that the bankruptcy filing rate for those admitted to the
hospital after an accident is 45% higher than those not admitted, but using regression controls to
suggest that the causes are jointly determined by background factors).
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uninsured risk, and therefore, when that amount is onerous, underinsured
individuals behave just like uninsured individuals. 51 Underinsured individuals
decline even high-value care. 52 One recent study of individuals in highdeductible health plans focused on emergency room visits, and distinguished
between appropriate utilization for high-severity incidents and inappropriate
utilization for low-severity incidents. The study found that the HDHP caused
poorer beneficiaries to dramatically reduce the amount of high-severity
emergency care they consumed. 53 Similarly, after acute myocardial infarction, it
is very important for individuals to get follow-up healthcare and medication. One
survey of patients with this condition found that one in seven experienced
financial barriers to getting that care, and over two thirds of those enjoyed health
insurance. 54 More generally, if cost-sharing causes individuals to decline highvalue healthcare, it undermines the price signal of a competitive market by
failing to properly reward high-impact innovations. 55
Health outcomes also suffer when cost-sharing burdens leave individuals
underinsured. There are many observational studies of this phenomenon, but here
too it is difficult to determine causation. There are many observable and
unobservable differences between those who have adequate versus inadequate
insurance. 56 The gold-standard investigation of this phenomenon is the RAND

51. See Michael D. Kogan et al., Underinsurance Among Children in the United States, 363
NEJM 841, 844, 847 (2010) (finding that 24% of children with continuous private insurance were
underinsured, and that “the group of children who were underinsured did not differ significantly
from the group of children who were never insured with respect to delayed or forgone care, lack of
a medical home, [and] difficulty obtaining referrals”).
52. See M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Disadvantaged, 26
HEALTH AFF. 1315, 1318 (2007); Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Consumer
Directed Healthcare: Except for the Healthy and Wealthy It’s Unwise, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED.
879 (2006). The RAND Health Insurance Experiment found that increased cost-sharing burdens
caused individuals to decline high-value and low-value healthcare alike. See JOSEPH P. NEWHOUSE
& INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., FREE FOR ALL?: LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE
EXPERIMENT 339 (1993).
53. J. Frank Wharam et al., Low-Socioeconomic-Status Enrollees In High-Deductible Plans
Reduced High-Severity Emergency Care, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1398 (2013).
54. Ali R. Rahimi et al., Financial Barriers to Health Care and Outcomes After Acute
Myocardial Infarction, 297 JAMA 1063 (2007).
55. See Darius Lakdawalla & Neeraj Sood, Insurance and Innovation in Health Care Markets
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11602, 2005) (arguing on certain idealized
assumptions that universal health insurance that guarantees access provides optimal incentives to
patent-holders).
56. See e.g., Donald P. Oswald et al., Underinsurance and Key Health Outcomes for Children
with Special Health Care Needs, 119 PEDIATRICS e341 (2007) (finding that “children with special
health care needs who were underinsured had significantly poorer outcomes than did children who
were adequately insured”); Rahmi, supra note 54 (finding that financial barriers to care were
associated with worse recovery after acute myocardial infarction, more angina, poorer quality of
life, and higher risk of rehospitalization).
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Health Insurance Experiment (HIE), which randomly assigned individuals to
health plans with different levels of cost-sharing and monitored their health
spending and health outcomes for three years. 57 While cost-sharing did not have
adverse effects on median and upper-income people, poorer individuals with
chronic illnesses experienced worse health outcomes due to cost-sharing. 58
Indeed, there have been many subsequent studies in the intervening decades, and
“[t]he better studies reinforce the HIE findings that low-income people in poor
health are more likely to suffer adverse health outcomes, such as increased rates
of emergency department (ED) use, hospitalizations, admission to nursing
homes, and death, when increased cost-sharing causes them to reduce their use of
health care.” 59
C. Overinsurance
Paracelsus said that the difference between a poison and a drug is the
dosage. The right dose is the one that achieves the purposes of securing a health
outcome while minimizing the adverse side effects. The prior section showed
how too little insurance, which is to say too much cost-sharing, can undermine
the purposes of protecting against risk and guaranteeing access to care. But there
is also a problem of “overinsurance.” Insurance can also have the opposite side
effect of stimulating consumption, even among those who could afford to
consume without insurance. 60
Economists call this side effect “moral hazard.” 61 Although the term is
57. NEWHOUSE & INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., supra note 52.
58. Id.
59. Swartz, supra note 9, at 12; see also R. Scott Braithwaite & Allison B. Rosen, Linking
Cost Sharing to Value: An Unrivaled Yet Unrealized Public Health Opportunity, 146 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 602, 603 (2007) (reviewing the literature showing adverse effects of cost-sharing
on indigent individuals); Dahlia K. Remler & Jessica Greene, Cost-Sharing: A Blunt Instrument, 30
ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 293 (2009) (also reviewing the literature).
60. This meaning of “overinsurance” is distinct from the casualty insurance context, where the
term refers to “insurance that exceeds in amount the actual cash value of the property insured.”
Overinsurance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/overinsurance
(last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
61. See JOHN A. NYMAN, THE THEORY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 144–51 (2003);
see also Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 531
(1968) (criticizing the understanding of moral hazard as an individual moral failing as opposed to
rational economic behavior in response to lower cost); Mark V. Pauly, Adverse Selection and
Moral Hazard, in INCENTIVES AND CHOICE IN HEALTH CARE 107 (Frank A. Sloan & Hirschel
Kasper eds., 2008) (distinguishing the moral hazard problem from the fact that health insurance can
also expand access, solving a wealth effect); Deborah Stone, Behind the Jargon: Moral Hazard, 36
J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 887–91 (2011) (reviewing the literature on the way this term has been
used and abused). It is also possible that insurance has a second behavioral function that causes
individuals to make riskier lifestyle choices, which is sometimes referred to as “ex ante” moral
hazard. See Anderson E. Stanciole, Health Insurance and Lifestyle Choices: Identifying Ex Ante
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loaded, the economics are simple. If one group of persons is offered a product for
free, and another group is offered a product for some affordable cost greater than
zero, the latter group will consume less, all other things being equal. Full
insurance (Zone 3) makes things free at the point of consumption, eliminating the
possibility of making any cost-benefit tradeoffs. When costs are completely
externalized to an insurer, individuals make purchases whose benefits are
outweighed by the costs, which reduces social welfare.
Such purchases also disrupt the price signal that is essential to a wellfunctioning market. If patients have no concern for the tradeoff between price
and value, producers (e.g., pharmaceutical companies) and providers (e.g.,
hospitals) will make goods and services with higher prices and lower value than
they otherwise would. 62 Rather than manufacturers investing in developing
products that reduce costs and deliver more value to consumers, they may instead
rationally invest in marketing existing products. 63 Indeed, this seems to be
happening. 64
On the other hand, cost-sharing is designed to reintroduce some price
sensitivity. In this way, a cost-sharing burden can reduce the number of
treatments consumed or change which treatments are consumed. 65 It may change
behavior in this way by causing the patient to consider “whether a purchase is
worth its price” (or at least a fraction thereof) and sometimes say no.66
When individuals exceed their cap on cost-sharing in Zone 2 and move into
full insurance in Zone 3, this function is stymied. 67 To determine whether
someone is overinsured, then, is to ask whether the cap is lower than necessary to
achieve the purposes of health insurance. If it is lower than necessary, then
Moral Hazard in the US Market, 33 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 627, 644 (2008).
62. See, e.g., Robinson & Brown, supra note 28.
63. See REGINA E. HERZLINGER, MARKET-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES IN
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA’S LARGEST SERVICE INDUSTRY 84 (1999); Einer Elhauge, The
Limited Regulatory Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525 (1996)
(discussing the distorted incentives in healthcare production).
64. See Marc-Andre Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A New Estimate of
Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 PLOS MED. 29, 32 (2008)
(discussing a PhRMA press release and concluding that “pharmaceutical companies spend almost
twice as much on promotion as they do on R&D”).
65. See Kennedy v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 924 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining the
behavior-modification function, and upholding an insurer’s refusal to pay a provider of medical
services that waived a copayment).
66. Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the
New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REV. 643, 659 (2008); see also Michael Chernew et al.,
Value-Based Insurance Design, 26 HEALTH AFF. w195, w195–96 (2007) (describing this as
“standard economic theory”).
67. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay on
Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 587 (2006) (“Once consumers reach the
limits of the deductible, they have little reason to limit their consumption of health care . . . .”).
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insurance’s side effect of demand stimulation is gratuitous; it is a cost without
benefit.
For individuals in the top quintile of income, which starts at over $100,000
per year and ranges to the hundreds of millions (so high that it extends well
beyond the scale of Figure 1), the common $3,000 worst-case scenario for costsharing would amount to only one out of every $50 dollars they earn (2%). These
individuals are likely overinsured. A $4,000 cost-sharing exposure, or even a
$12,000 exposure, might not present an unbearable risk or undermine their access
to healthcare. Many of those in the top two quintiles, representing 40% of
workers, may be overinsured.
Here too, there are line-drawing and identification problems. Conceptually,
one way to test for the existence of overinsurance is to remove some marginal
insurance and see what happens. If the beneficiary consumes less healthcare but
her health does not suffer, then the prior level of insurance may have been too
large.
For median and higher-income beneficiaries, the HIE found that full health
insurance stimulated spending compared to experimental conditions with
bearable but substantial cost-sharing. 68 The effect was large: in experimental
conditions with nearly full insurance—i.e., people that are always in Zone 3, like
those that have exceeded their caps in any policy—the health expenses were 50%
greater than in plans with large but bearable deductibles. With four experimental
conditions, ranging from 0% insurance to 95% insurance, a dose-response
relationship appeared. Lower cost-sharing led to more spending, even though the
overall exposure to risk was capped at 10% of income or $1,000.
Notably, the HIE’s observed reduction of consumption had no detectable
adverse impact on the health outcomes of the median and higher-income
beneficiaries. 69 This finding suggests that they were overinsured prior to the
experiment. Given the difficulties that individuals have in discerning the
difference between high-value and low-value healthcare, and the lack of price
transparency in the healthcare market, it is perhaps surprising that cost-sharing
works at all. 70 Nonetheless, recent empirical studies have yielded similar findings
68. See generally NEWHOUSE & INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., supra note 52.
69. Id. Similarly, a recent randomized experiment assigned one group to receive Medicaid
benefits compared to a control group that did not and “showed that Medicaid coverage generated
no significant improvements in measured physical health outcomes in the first 2 years, but it did
increase the use of health services.” Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon Experiment—Effects of
Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes, 368 NEJM 1713, 1713 (2013). Medicaid coverage did “raise rates
of diabetes detection and management, lower rates of depression, and reduce financial strain.” Id.
70. See Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Pricing of U.S. Hospital Services: Chaos Behind a Veil of
Secrecy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 57 (2006) (discussing the problem of price transparency); Peter A. Ubel,
Amy P. Abernethy & S. Yousuf Zafar, Full Disclosure—Out-of-Pocket Costs as Side Effects, 369
NEJM 1484 (2013) (arguing that physicians have a duty to provide such price information to
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to the HIE. They show that insurance stimulates spending and that cost-sharing
reduces that effect, with little or no adverse impact documented for high-income
individuals. 71
It is possible for cost-sharing to reduce healthcare costs without undermining
health because there are many procedures that have very high costs and little or
no proven benefit. 72 Some healthcare consumption is actually
counterproductive. 73 According to a comprehensive review of the relevant
literature, “less than half of all medical care is based on or supported by adequate
evidence about its effectiveness.” 74 Scholars calculate that “$910 billion per year,
or 34%” of U.S. health spending is waste. 75
Examples of low-value but expensive healthcare include prophylactic heart
stent surgeries (which cost about seven billion dollars a year but have not been
patients, and discussing state legal mandates for price transparency).
71. See, e.g., Robinson & Brown, supra note 28, at 1392 (showing reductions in consumption
with cost-sharing); Marika Cabral & Neale Mahoney, Externalities and Taxation of Supplemental
Insurance: A Study of Medicare and Medigap 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 19787, Jan. 2014) (showing by regression discontinuity analysis that Medigap policies offset
cost-sharing burdens in Medicare and increase program spending by 22%). See generally
JONATHAN GRUBER, THE ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE
RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND 10 (2006) (“In summary, more recent work
in a wide variety of settings and for a wide variety of subpopulations has confirmed the main
conclusion of the HIE: higher patient co-payments reduced medical utilization.”).
72. See generally Christopher T. Robertson, A Presumption Against Expensive Healthcare
Consumption, 49 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). One might wonder why physicians even offer
such high-cost low-value procedures. See Christopher Robertson, Susannah Rose & Aaron
Kesselheim, Effect of Financial Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care Professionals: A
Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 452, 463 (2012) (calling for greater regulation of
physicians’ financial incentives and relationships with industry); Stone, supra note 61, at 891
(suggesting that physicians rather than patients are the problem).
73. See Bernard Black et al., The Impact of Health Insurance on Near-Elderly Health and
Mortality 24 (Northwestern Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 12-09, Nov. 2013) (“Insured women with
health insurance were more likely to receive hormone-replacement therapy, which in hindsight
raised breast cancer rates without reducing heart disease rates. Insured men are more likely to
receive prostate cancer screening and follow-up testing and treatment, with no overall benefit; the
testing alone carries substantial mortality risk from infection. People with health insurance are more
likely to receive CT scans without strong clinical indication; the radiation exposure then predicts
higher cancer rates some years hence.”).
74. Research on the Comparative Effectiveness of Medical Treatments: Issues and Options for
an Expanded Federal Role, CBO 11 (Dec. 2007), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles
/ftpdocs/88xx/doc8891/12-18-comparativeeffectiveness.pdf. A recent review of every article
published in the New England Journal of Medicine for a decade found that when randomized trials
were utilized to test the efficacy of commonly used medical procedures, they failed more often than
passed. Vinay Prasad et al., A Decade of Reversal: An Analysis of 146 Contradicted Medical
Practices, 88 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 790, 792 (2013).
75. Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care, 307
JAMA 1513, 1515 (2012); see also Barry R. Furrow, Cost Control and the Affordable Care Act:
CRAMPing Our Health Care Appetite, 13 NEV. L.J. 822, 836–43 (2013) (reviewing this literature).
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proven to be more effective than a safer and cheaper regimen of drugs) and offlabel use of patented chemotherapy drugs (which have not been proven to be
more effective than standard, generic drugs, and also account for billions of
dollars of health spending). 76 These patients have time to consider cheaper
standard-of-care regimens, and cost-sharing may be worthwhile if it nudges them
in that direction.
The foregoing examples are useful to see that the value of healthcare
consumption varies widely, but it bears emphasis that this conclusion does not
depend on any showing that some particular health spending is good and other
health spending is bad. Nor does it depend on the proposition that cost-sharing
will make patients aware of this difference. Instead, this Article is agnostic about
which and how much healthcare any individual should consume. The point here
is just that surplus insurance distorts those decisions when the degree of coverage
is unnecessary to serve its risk-protection and access-guarantee purposes. In
Section II.A, the question will become normative: whether lower-paid workers
should help pay for such distortive insurance, and whether it should be
subsidized through tax policy.
Further, wasteful healthcare spending arises across the income spectrum, and
the presence of health insurance exacerbates that problem because it eliminates
the price signal for all workers. 77 The point here is simply that, for some workers,
health insurance stimulates wasteful consumption without offsetting benefits for
access and risk-protection. A lower amount of insurance could achieve its
purposes just as well.
II. SCALED COST-SHARING (SCS)
Policymakers and insurance designers have been in a tug-of-war over
whether to expand or contract health insurance. 78 Some have pointed to the
underinsurance problem and clamored for reductions in or even the elimination
of cost-sharing. 79 Meanwhile, the market, with nudges from some policymakers,
76. See Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back in the
Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 928–30 (2013) (discussing these two examples and
citing sources from the medical literature).
77. See Steven B. Cohen & Namrata Uberoi, Differentials in the Concentration in the Level of
Health Expenditures Across Population Subgroups in the U.S., 2010, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RESEARCH & QUALITY 9 fig.7 (Statistical Brief #421 Jan. 2012), http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb
/data_files/publications/st421/stat421.pdf (showing similar distributions of high-spenders and lowspenders within each income quintile).
78. See Stone, supra note 61 (reviewing this literature).
79. See CAM DONALDSON, CREDIT CRUNCH HEALTH CARE 20, 26 (2011) (“User charges are an
idea that is intellectually dead, but keeps coming back to threaten our publicly funded health care
systems, and have thus been classed by leading health economists in Canada as a policy zombie.
Occasionally, the zombie has to be slain . . . . It is wrong, unfair and ineffective to try to limit
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has been moving towards greater cost-sharing, putatively to address “moral
hazard.” 80 Each of these moves solves one side of the problem, but only by
exacerbating the other. The more elegant solution comes from recognizing that,
although overinsurance and underinsurance are both real problems, they affect
two different populations. To address both sides of the problem, we need to tailor
cost-sharing burdens to each beneficiary’s ability to pay.
This Article develops the proposal to scale the maximum out-of-pocket
exposure (the Zone 3 threshold), and suggests that ability to pay should be
approximated by the worker’s salary, as it is readily knowable by the employer,
who pays those wages. 81 Administrative costs may thus be minimized, since the
data is already in the employer’s hands. An employer would only need to
multiply the wages by a simple ratio (e.g., 6%) in order to calculate a new cap on
overall cost-sharing. It may be tempting to interrogate workers’ ability to pay
more precisely, but such efforts could become burdensome and divisive, while
providing little additional accuracy compared to the large improvement gained as
we move from no-scaling to income-scaling. 82 Nonetheless, the employer should
consider whether additional reliable information can be gathered at low cost,
such as a certification by the employee as to whether his or her spouse earns
significantly more income. 83
consumer and patient access through user fees . . . .”); MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW,
TRUE SECURITY 171 (1999) (discussing the risk of medical crises reducing income below a “decent”
level and causing an “unacceptably steep decline in living standards”).
80. See generally Robinson, supra note 9 (discussing the market and policy trend towards
greater cost-sharing).
81. An employer could also use the wages paid as a rebuttable presumption, and allow
workers to submit contrary evidence. Generally, however, assuming that the employer is not going
to also modify the premiums paid by workers to account for different cost-sharing levels, see infra
Section III.B, then the workers will uniformly be motivated to request downward adjustments for
cost-sharing, creating a skew.
82. See Katherine Swartz, Expert Reflection, Easier Said than Done, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 855, 855, 857 (2011) (focusing on premiums: “[I]t is difficult to judge people’s ability to
afford a necessity like health insurance on the basis of simple factors such as income, age, number
and age of family members, and their health status [along with] . . . ‘deserving’ exceptions . . . . I
grudgingly began to realize that a simple percent-of-income rule was more practical and avoided
moral debates that were sure to arise . . . .”); see also, Carla Saenz, What is Affordable Health
Insurance? The Reasonable Tradeoff Account of Affordability, 19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 401
(2009) (proposing “the reasonable tradeoff account [where] one does not to have to sacrifice other
benefit(s) that are comparable in importance to the benefits of health coverage”). See generally
Didem M. Bernard et al., Wealth, Income, and the Affordability of Health Insurance, 28 HEALTH
AFF. 887 (2009) (discussing correlations between wealth and income).
83. Many firms already require employees to make a similar certification about whether the
spouse is eligible for health insurance from another source. See e.g., Spouse/Partner Coverage
Certification, MIAMI U., http://www.units.muohio.edu/humanresources/documents/formslibrary
/benefitswellness/SpouseCoverageCertification.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2014). Note that part of
the ACA seems to require firms to consider each employee’s household income, to determine
whether its required worker’s contribution to insurance premiums complies with law, so the
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A. Normative Considerations
This Section examines normative considerations around scaling. First, it
considers whether scaling has a mandate from justice, and whether it is useful to
draw on terms commonly used to evaluate taxation schemes. Next, it considers
how ability to pay interacts with desert and value as criteria for normative
evaluation of healthcare burdens.
A complete normative argument for scaling of cost-sharing burdens would
require stipulation of a foundational theory of justice, but the appeal of SCS is
not peculiar to any one such theory. 84 For instance, Norman Daniels offers a
theory of “health justice,” which draws from John Rawls, focusing on equality of
opportunity. 85 The application is straightforward. As shown above, those in the
lower wage ranges are not getting the benefit of health insurance when their costsharing burdens are so high that they lack access to care and must make tragic
choices on the verge of bankruptcy and foreclosure. 86 While other insured
individuals enjoy access to that same care and do not face the tragic choices, we
have failed to achieve the normative goal that is equality of opportunity. 87
Alternatively, perhaps we have failed to achieve the “decent minimum” that is
required under many conceptions of justice. 88
These rationales track the more general arguments for ensuring access to
needed care and protection against risk. 89 It is hard to imagine a theory of justice
that would require universal health insurance, but would also countenance such
an ineffective and unfair version of it. 90
information costs may already be sunk for that other statutory purpose. 26 U.S.C.A. §
36B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II) (West 2014).
84. For a more comprehensive discussion of the possible normative starting points, see
William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the
Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 602–47 (2007).
85. See generally NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY (2008).
86. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Note that these studies of medical bankruptcies
and medical foreclosures have found a significant incidence even among those with health
insurance, due to large levels of out-of-pocket medical spending.
87. See Brendan Saloner & Norman Daniels, The Ethics of the Affordability of Health
Insurance, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 815, 815 (2011) (discussing the onerous cost-sharing
exposure that remains even under the ACA, in light of Daniels’s theory of health justice).
88. See generally Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 55 (1984).
89. See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1449, 1455, 1480
(1994) (arguing for a right to access the level of care enjoyed by the middle class: “An individual’s
ability to pay should indeed be irrelevant to determining that individual’s access to the minimum of
adequate care.”); see also Allison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates,
Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 10–12 (2009); Sharona Hoffman,
Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 668 (2003).
90. John V. Jacobi, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 531, 581 (2005). (arguing that “[i]t is difficult to describe a person as having ‘health

259

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

XIV:2 (2014)

Still, there are more libertarian theories of justice that do not require
universal coverage at all, regardless of scaling. Thus, although there is a broad
normative mandate for SCS, its appeal may not be universal. 91 Yet whatever
reasons require health insurance coverage would presumptively require SCS too.
After all, cost-sharing is just the absence of insurance for certain costs.
As an alternative approach to this issue, the language of taxation may
provide normative traction as to the fair distribution of healthcare expenses
between individuals and their collective insurance pools. A “progressive” tax is
typically paid as a percent of adjusted income, with several tiers of increasingly
higher percentages. 92 Such a policy is sensible to the extent that income past a
certain level is more disposable than income at the lower levels, which must be
allocated to basic human needs. 93 A “flat rate” or “proportional” tax, is one
where everyone pays the same percentage of income. Although rare today in
overt forms, a “per-head” tax is one where each individual pays the same dollaramount, regardless of wealth or income. 94 The per-head tax is thought to be
objectionably regressive.
Our current system, in which each employee faces the same amount of
healthcare costs in order to get the full insurance of Zone 3, is analogous to a
head tax. 95 It is regressive in the sense that lower-paid workers must pay a larger
percentage of their incomes than higher-paid workers.
I am here invoking the familiar progressivity of the income tax as a way to
insurance’ if she does not have ‘catastrophic coverage’ for unexpected, large, medically necessary
care,” and if that coverage means anything, it must protect people against declaring bankruptcy or
losing their house on account of the medical bills).
91. See Uwe Reinhardt, Uncompensated Hospital Care, in UNCOMPENSATED HOSPITAL CARE:
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 1, 6 (Frank A. Sloan et al. eds., 1986) (arguing that normative
debates about health policy are stymied by a difficulty of settling on first principles).
92. See Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for
Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 117 (1999) (surveying the rationales and
arguing for constitutionality). See generally Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare
and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905 (1987)
(arguing that the diminishing marginal utility of money makes it efficient to take more from higherpaid individuals).
93. Martinez, supra note 92, at 117. Even modern progressivity, which may be taken for
granted, is not uncontroversial. See, e.g., Frank Warren Hackett, The Constitutionality of the
Graduated Income Tax Law, 25 YALE L.J. 427, 438 (1916) (It is “untenable . . . that a man’s ability
to pay ought to be taken as a measure of what he should be made to pay.”).
94. Sales taxes on basic goods like food staples can be regressive in this sense, because they
tax each person for the fixed cost of being alive, regardless of income. Thus, those with lower
incomes must pay a higher proportion of their incomes in the sales tax on the basic goods. For this
reason, some jurisdictions exempt basic goods from sales tax. See Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument
for Tax Reform Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1, 50 (2002).
95. See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustices in American Health
Care, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 42 (2006) (explaining that the current system is regressive
because higher-income members utilize services more than lower-income members).
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highlight the contingent nature of our current baseline for cost-sharing, where
each person pays the same amount. Against the per-capita baseline, scaling may
seem provocative. But if our society had started there, it might seem completely
natural, and a per-capita system might seem odd. Similarly, in addition to
proportional taxation, it has become routine to use inflation-adjusted incomes to
make comparisons across time, and to use purchasing power parity calculations
to make comparisons across foreign currencies. The use of nominal equivalence
in health insurance is thus something of an outlier.
One might take this invocation of the tax code more literally, and then
challenge the applicability of normative theories of taxation to cost-sharing
burdens in employer-based health insurance. 96 Do such “public” conceptions of
justice apply in the private sector? However, given the massive tax-subsidy that
the United States government provides for employer-sponsored health insurance,
it would be difficult to argue that these transactions are so private that they
escape the demands of justice. 97
Putting that predication problem aside, the current cost-sharing mechanism
is even worse than a head tax or a flat tax because the ability to make initial costsharing payments is sometimes the precondition for accessing subsequent
healthcare. Additionally, it has the effect of redistributing from common
premiums paid by all to benefits enjoyed by the wealthy. 98 These are sometimes
called “vertical equity” problems. 99 It is also perverse to charge individuals
premiums for health insurance that has deductibles so high that the beneficiary is
unlikely to ever actually get covered healthcare.100 Larger questions about how
health insurance interacts with the tax code are revisited below. 101 For present
purposes it suffices to show that the current per-head user fees for healthcare are
regressive in application, and that SCS is a prima facie solution to that problem.
More broadly, it is interesting to see how SCS can change the terms of the
96. Americans have traditionally viewed health insurance as a “private” matter, unlike taxes.
Descriptively, since World War II at least, this framing has not been accurate, since the federal
government has used the tax code to subsidize “private” insurance. Normatively, even aside from
this public subsidy, one may cogently argue that such a fundamental determinant of wellbeing
should not be conceived as a private concern, immune from the demands of justice.
97. See infra Section III.C.
98. Bloche, supra note 52, at 1322 (discussing this “Reverse Robin Hood” effect).
99. See e.g., Hoffman, Oil and Water, supra note 89, at 33 (explaining that without incomesubsidies, an insurance mandate could cause the “healthy poor [to] subsidize the sick wealthy, a
result many would find troubling”); see also David Pratt, The Past, Present and Future of Health
Care Reform: Can It Happen?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 767, 784 (2007).
100. See Paul D. Jacobs & Gary Claxton, Comparing the Assets of Uninsured Households to
Cost Sharing Under High-Deductible Health Plans, 27 HEALTH AFF, w214 (2008) (arguing that it
is a poor use of money to pay insurance premiums to get insurance with a deductible that one is
unlikely to be able meet).
101. See infra Sections III.C & III.D.
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normative debates around health insurance. Consider desert and value as criteria
for evaluating cost-sharing burdens in general, with or without income scaling.
Along the desert dimension, some have criticized cost-sharing from the
perspective of “luck egalitarianism,” the theory that an individual should not bear
responsibility for healthcare costs merely because one is unlucky enough to be
sick. 102 Such costs are arguably not deserved for persons who have not taken
unreasonable health risks. In this vein, John Nyman has asked, “What healthy
person would purchase a coronary bypass procedure, a leg amputation, or a liver
transplant just because the price has fallen to zero?”103 People buy those services
because they feel that they need them, and will do so, to the extent that they are
able, regardless of price. In this domain, the “behavioral” function of cost-sharing
is stymied, and cost-sharing burdens may seem like an inequitable tax on being
sick. 104 These risks should arguably be redistributed through insurance instead.
If one had a reliable way to distinguish deserved health costs from
undeserved health costs, then such a desert criterion could be implemented in
conjunction with SCS. Cost-sharing would be waived for “undeserved”
healthcare costs, and the remaining costs would be scaled.
However, SCS may actually obviate the need for such an adjustment. It takes
much of the wind out of the “tax on sickness” critique of cost-sharing. The core
intuition of the luck egalitarian is expressed as the idea that we are “a country in
which no one will ever again suffer financial disaster because they had the bad
luck to get sick.” 105 By adjusting cost-sharing burdens in accordance with ability
to pay, SCS takes the threat of financial disaster off the table, thereby
(imperfectly) ensuring that unbearable risks will not be distributed according to
bad luck. Similarly, with SCS the question is no longer whether a patient will
102. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 73 (2000) (“Brute luck is a matter of
how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles.”); Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1922–
32 (discussing the brute luck conception of health insurance).
103. John A. Nyman, American Health Policy: Cracks in the Foundation, 32 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 759, 766 (2007); see also Swartz supra note 9, at 10 (noting that in situations of intense
healthcare, “people have very little control . . . because physicians and other providers follow
norms of care”).
104. See Universal Health Care: Hearing on S. 531 and H. 1947 Before the S. Comm. on
Ways & Means, 1999 Leg., 181st Sess. 10 (Mass. 1999) (statement of Alan Sager & Deborah
Socolar, Access & Affordability Monitoring Project); NEWHOUSE & INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., supra
note 52, at 356 (discussing the concern that for the chronically ill, “[p]aying the initial cost sharing
year after year may also be viewed as inequitable—that is, as a tax on the sick”); Jacobi supra note
90, at 577 (similar); Peter Vallentyne, Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial
Opportunities, 112 ETHICS 529, 532–38 (2002) (similar); Daniel Wikler, Who Should Be Blamed
for Being Sick?, 14 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAV. 11 (1987) (similar).
105. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1922 (quoting Congressman Steny Hoyer); see also Bloche,
supra note 52, at 1325 (“Medical coverage is more than a business proposition; it is an expression
of our commitment to each other. Cost sharing that renders high-value care unaffordable breaches
this commitment.”) (emphasis added).
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have access to healthcare. The question is simply whether its bearable costs
should be paid individually or collectively.
In this light, while SCS will cause high-income individuals to pay more in
absolute terms when they get sick, it is difficult to say that such a burden is
unjust. High-income individuals likely also benefitted from luck in other
dimensions of life. 106 Unless luck egalitarians are going to undertake a massive
multidimensional redistribution scheme, there would seem to be no reason to
focus on health in particular. Thus, where the luck egalitarian critique of costsharing has the most intuitive force, SCS moots the concern. These
considerations suggest that the criterion of “ability to bear risk” should be
prioritized over the “deservedness” criterion when designing cost-sharing
mechanisms. To the extent that a luck egalitarian objection to cost-sharing
remains forceful, SCS has clarified the terms of the debate.
Consider a more profound rejoinder that any proposal to increase costsharing, even among the relatively wealthy, is unjust. Rather than putting an
affordable price on healthcare as a rationing function, one could cogently argue
for other mechanisms: some central planner—a private or public regulator—
could simply refuse to allow healthcare spending that seems wasteful at the
prices demanded by producers and providers. 107 One difficulty of such an
approach is that drugs and devices may be more valuable for some individuals
than others because of heterogeneity in biology, social circumstances, and
personal preferences. This makes it difficult for a third party to assess value to a
particular patient. 108 Another difficulty is that such centralized rationing tends to
reduce patient choice. Cost-sharing is unique as a rationing mechanism because it
keeps the choice in the hands of the incentivized consumer. 109 For these reasons,
low-income and high-income individuals alike may rationally prefer SCS over
other rationing mechanisms. Nonetheless, let me emphasize that the argument
106. Luck egalitarians could assert a much more radical thesis that even bearable unlucky
costs (e.g., the risk of needing an aspirin from the drugstore) should be redistributed through social
insurance. For a set of similarly radical claims, nonetheless focusing on expensive treatments, see
Shlomi Segall, Is Health (Really) Special? Health Policy Between Rawlsian and Luck Egalitarian
Justice, 274 J. APPLIED PHIL. 344 (2010) (arguing for public funding of breast reduction surgery,
skin color change treatments, gender reassignments, and even surgery to allow male pregnancy, if
possible, primarily because they would be unaffordable otherwise).
107. See Christopher Robertson & David Yokum, The Burden of Deciding for Yourself, 11
IND. HEALTH L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
108. See generally Elhauge, supra note 63 (discussing the difficulty of rationing according to
cost-benefit analyses).
109. See CONSUMER-DRIVEN HEALTH CARE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PROVIDERS, PAYERS, AND
POLICYMAKERS, at xvii (Regina Herzlinger ed., 2004) (describing “a radical turn away from the
technocratic, top-down policies that just say no to providers and consumers”); John Bronsteen et
al., ERISA, Agency Costs, and the Future of Health Care in the United States, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2297, 2330 (2008) (similar); Robertson supra note 76, at 931–43 (explaining the problems with
physician rationing and insurer rationing).
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here is conditional: if a health insurance system chooses to utilize cost-sharing,
then it should be scaled.
Along another dimension of evaluation, some have argued that cost-sharing
burdens should be adjusted to reflect the value of the underlying healthcare
consumption in order to steer patients towards higher-value healthcare. 110 In this
move towards “value-based insurance design” (VBID), the highest-value
procedures—like vaccinations—would have no cost-sharing burden at all. 111 This
move can address paternalistic concerns that cost-sharing may harm health, even
for individuals that can afford those costs. Where such instances can be
identified, cost-sharing can and arguably should be waived.
Sometimes VBID may involve scaling upwards as well. For example,
insurers have imposed cost-sharing tiers for pharmaceuticals to shift patients
towards generic drugs, which have a better cost-benefit profile. 112 One problem
with this value-based approach is that when costs are scaled upwards, lower-paid
beneficiaries may lose access to the more expensive treatments, which are
thought to be low-value, and such a change would thereby also undermine
equality of opportunity. One might cogently argue that lower-income individuals
should not have access to high-cost, low-value healthcare. But if insurance
designers have normative commitments to access, equality of opportunity, or
patient choice, value-scaling may thus be problematic as applied to lower-income
individuals.
Here too, if there is a problem, the solution is to calibrate value-scaling
according to the more fundamental criterion of ability to pay, which arises from
the very purposes of insurance. The objection to value-scaling can thereby be
resolved by SCS when the mechanisms are used together.
While one may be ecumenical about the values that health insurance serves,
the foregoing arguments have suggested that ability to pay should be preeminent,
as it arises from the very purposes of insurance itself. More broadly, it is clear
that there are normative imperatives for reform towards SCS. These normative
considerations should inform policy debates and motivate reform in the private

110. See Swartz, supra note 9, at 4 (describing this as one of two major “trends in health
insurance,” but noting that “to date, the handful of studies on the effects of VBID have been
conducted by advocates of VBID”); see also Elhauge, supra note 89, at 1480 (arguing that there
should be a diversity of health insurance plans, which would allow consumers choice of rationing
priorities); Russell B. Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research as Choice Architecture: The
Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523
(2014).
111. Cf. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1001(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-13 (West
2014) (prohibiting insurers from imposing copays for preventive services). See generally
Braithewaite & Rosen, supra note 59; Chernew et al., supra note 66.
112. See Robinson, supra note 9, at 1212 (discussing pharmaceutical tiers and the limits of the
technique being applied more broadly).
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market for health insurance.
B. Precedents
There are intellectual precedents for SCS. In the market for goods and
services, sellers often use differential pricing to sell to consumers with a range of
willingness to pay. 113 This strategy can increase access to goods and improve
profits for the seller, enhancing overall welfare. Several European countries have
adopted income scaling for speeding tickets in an effort to make the deterrent
effect proportionate across heterogeneous drivers. 114
For health insurance in particular, it is important to distinguish the proposal
for scaling cost-sharing (out-of-pocket payments by insured individuals for their
medical care) from the scaling of insurance premiums (monthly payments
required in order to maintain an active insurance plan). Many scholars have
recommended this latter option, which already appears in some federal programs
and in benefit plans for about 10% of large employers. 115 While premium scaling
may serve fairness goals, it does almost nothing on its own to solve the problems
of underinsurance and overinsurance.
With respect to scaling of cost-sharing in particular, in the 1970s Martin
Feldstein argued for a government-sponsored health insurance system, which
would include “an annual direct expense limit (i.e., deductible) that increased
with family income,” an idea that he has occasionally revisited with co-

113. See generally ROBERT L. PHILLIPS, PRICING AND REVENUE OPTIMIZATION 74 (2005).
Variants of this strategy include pure price discrimination, as well as the differentiation of very
similar products (e.g., Honda and Acura), so that individual consumers can reveal their own
willingness to pay. Coupons are thought to have a similar effect, allowing consumers with greater
price sensitivity (and lower opportunity costs for their time) to gain access to consumer products
that would otherwise be too expensive.
114. See Frank Jordans, Speeding Fines Being Linked to Income in Europe, SFGATE, (Jan. 11,
2010),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Speeding-fines-being-linked-to-income-in-Europe3275939.php (reporting a record speeding fine of $290,000 for a Ferrari driver in Switzerland).
115. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Medicare, 20 ELDER L.J. 1, 25–28 (2012)
(explaining that the ACA also created an additional Medicare payroll tax for high-earnings
individuals); Richard L. Kaplan, Taking Medicare Seriously, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 792–94
(1998) (discussing income-based means testing in Medicare); Employer Health Benefits 2012,
supra note 6, at 73 (the 10% figure for employers); Mary E. Medland, Shaving Health Costs, HR
MAGAZINE, June 2005, at 95–96 (discussing prevalence among employers); Saloner & Daniels,
supra note 87, at 820 (arguing for “progressive financing” of insurance premiums but noting that
“[t]he more payments at the point of service such a system involves, the less progressive it will be
(and the ACA includes some such payments)”). The ACA also created refundable tax credits keyed
to income to subsidize insurance premium payments for poorer individuals in the exchanges. See
Seth J. Chandler, The Architecture of Contemporary Healthcare Reform and Effective Marginal
Tax Rates, 29 MISS. C. L. REV. 335, 339–40 (2010) (discussing section 1401(a) of the Affordable
Care Act).
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authors. 116 Later that decade, the RAND HIE included a $1,000 “stop-loss” cap
on cost-sharing burdens in all their plans (equal to $3,846 in 2013), but scaled
that cap downwards for lower-income participants. 117 While the study has been a
cornerstone of health policy research for decades, this particular feature of
scaling has received scant attention.118
In the 1980s, a few scholars included income tiers for cost-sharing in
comprehensive reform proposals for Medicare. 119 In a 1985 survey of employers,
Herzlinger and Schwartz found that 7% of firms were scaling deductibles
according to income, and they recommended broader adoption of the
mechanism. 120
In the early 1990s, in the only article dedicated to the idea, Rice and Thorpe
proposed scaling in the employer-based insurance market, and proposed changes
to the tax code to account for other sources of income. 121 Rice and Thorpe also
noted that some extant employers (about 2–3%) were then using simple forms of
scaling. 122 Contemporary research has revealed a few such examples.123
116. Martin S. Feldstein, A New Approach to National Health Insurance, 23 PUB. INT. 93, 99
(1971); see also DAVID DRAKE, MANDATE FOR 21ST CENTURY AMERICA: UNIVERSAL HEALTH
INSURANCE 68 (2007) (attributing the idea to Feldstein and developing it further); Martin Feldstein
& Jonathan Gruber, A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform, in 9 TAX POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 103, 103–04 (James M. Poterba ed., 2005) (calculating welfare effects of the proposal,
arguing that it could “reduce aggregate health spending by nearly 20 percent”); Martin S. Feldstein,
The High Cost of Hospitals and What to Do About It, 48 PUB. INT. 40 (1977) (similar).
117. The scaling was based on 5, 10, or 15% of annual income (depending on experimental
condition). See NEWHOUSE & INS. EXPERIMENT GRP., supra note 52, at 6, 401–02. The experiment
was conducted between 1971 and 1982. Using 1977 as the year for reference, the $1,000 cap on
cost-sharing would be equal to $3,846 in 2013 dollars. See Robert H. Brook et al., The Health
Insurance Experiment: A Classic RAND Study Speaks to the Current Health Care Reform Debate,
RAND CORP. 2 (2006), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2006
/RAND_RB9174.pdf (using 1977 as the reference-year); CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU LAB.
STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=1000&year1=1977&year2=2013
(showing
$3,844.17 in 2013 value).
118. See, e.g., FRANK A. SLOAN & CHEE-RUEY HSIEH, HEALTH ECONOMICS 102 (2012)
(discussing the RAND study as pivotal for understanding health economics).
119. See William C. Hsiao & Nancy L. Kelly, Medicare Benefits: A Reassessment, 62
MILBANK MEM’L FUND Q. HEALTH & SOC’Y 207, 219 (1984) (“If patients have to share in the cost
of medical care, they should do so according to their ability to pay.”); Laurence S. Seidman,
Income-Related Cost Sharing: A Strategy for the Health Sector, in NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE:
WHAT NOW, WHAT LATER, WHAT NEVER? (Mark V. Pauly ed., 1980) (proposing scaling to be
carried out through federal income tax credits).
120. Regina E. Herzlinger & Jeffrey Schwartz, How Companies Tackle Health Care Costs:
Part I, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1985, at 69, 73; see also HERZLINGER supra note 63, at 257–58
(reiterating such a proposal in 1999 as one element of a major healthcare reform proposal);
Herzlinger & Schwartz, supra, at 79 (“To ensure equity,” catastrophic coverage “should be scaled
to income.”).
121. Thomas Rice & Kenneth E. Thorpe, Income-Related Cost Sharing in Health Insurance,
12 HEALTH AFF. 21, 23 (1993).
122. Id.
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Since 2000, a few scholars have mentioned the idea of SCS in a sentence or
two as part of a larger analysis. 124 For instance, in a 2006 working paper Jonathan
Gruber argued that “ideally, such income-related cost-sharing limits should be
incorporated into health insurance more broadly,” and used a 5% cap on costsharing to illustrate that it could provide significantly greater protection for many
Americans. 125
Thus, although the concept of scaling has been recognized periodically, it
has not yet achieved the sustained attention and prominence in scholarly and
policy debates that it deserves. 126 There has been no sustained consideration of
123. See e.g., Michelle Andrews, Employers Consider Cutting Health Insurance Premiums for
Lower Paid Workers, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/employers-consider-cutting-health-insurance-premiums-for-lower-paid-workers/2011/11/
30/gIQA19GCWO_story.html (describing how Pitney Bowes modified one of its health plans in
2011 so that it “sets the deductible, out-of-pocket maximum and company contribution based on
salary. Hourly workers, for example, have a $1,500 deductible and $3,000 out-of-pocket maximum,
while employees at the director level or higher have a $2,500 deductible and $5,000 out-of-pocket
maximum.”); Payers Refine Cost-Sharing Techniques to Target Patient Behavior, Treatment
Choices, MANAGED CARE WK., Dec. 8, 2003, at 1 (quoting Arnold Milstein discussing and
endorsing a move by Rockwell Automation Inc., which “have now begun for the first time to
income tier for maximum out-of-pocket limits”); 2013 Benefits Enrollment Guide, HARV. HUM.
RESOURCES 11, http://www.employment.harvard.edu/benefits/pdf/Benefits_Enrollment_Guide.pdf
(describing a program that reimburses all further copayments for individual employees earning less
than $95,000 who spend over $270 on office visits or $1,000 on prescription drugs and sets lower
thresholds for those earning less than $70,000).
124. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, HEALTH CARE AT RISK: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONSUMERDRIVEN MOVEMENT 196 (2007) (suggesting a major healthcare reform including “[r]easonable outof-pocket maximums . . . based on household income”); Bloche, supra note 52, at 1316 (arguing
for “reducing deductibles and copayments for the less well-off”); Alain C. Enthoven & Victor R.
Fuchs, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Past, Present, And Future, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1538,
1541 (2006) (“Many people believe that a fairer system would allocate costs more in proportion to
income because much of the demand for health care arises from reasons beyond the individual’s
control, such as genetic predisposition to heart attack or cancer.”); Havighurst & Richman supra
note 95, at 45 (“Our concerns . . . would be obviated if employers generally offered their employees
separate plans, each designed for a different income group.”); Hoffman supra note 1, at 1915
(mentioning the possibility of “tailoring unacceptable out-of-pocket exposure based on individual
income or assets”); Swartz supra note 9, at 24 (“[I]nsurance . . . could contain a cap on the
percentage of income that an individual or family has to pay out-of-pocket for medical care.”); J.
Frank Wharam, Dennis Ross-Degnan & Merideth Rosenthal, The ACA and High-Deductible
Insurance—Strategies for Sharpening a Blunt Instrument, 369 NEJM 1481 (2013) (“[V]ulnerable
people should be shifted into low–cost-sharing plans. Larger employers might be best positioned to
adopt this approach, by making employees’ premium and deductible obligations proportional to
their income. They could do so in a cost-neutral manner by cross-subsidizing low-income
workers.”); Wharam et al., supra note 53, at 1404 (“[P]olicy makers could use similar means-based
mechanisms to limit deductibles for low-income people.”).
125. Gruber, supra note 71, at 12.
126. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker & Dana Goldman, Patient Cost-Sharing and Healthcare
Spending Growth, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 47 (2011) (discussing wealth effects of cost-sharing and
reviewing potential reforms to cost-sharing, without discussing income-scaling).
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the idea in the legal literature. Indeed, prior to this Article, a leading textbook
noted that “nobody [was] proposing a consumer-directed health care plan that
would force individuals to pay a large share of extreme medical expenses, such
as the costs of chemotherapy, out of pocket.” 127 This Article does precisely that,
for those who can afford to pay such costs. At the same time, the Article
proposes to significantly reduce or eliminate cost-sharing for those who are
presently underinsured.
There are examples of scaling in public healthcare systems abroad, which
often simply waive cost-sharing burdens for poorer beneficiaries rather than
scaling proportionally along the full income spectrum. 128 In the United States, the
Medicaid program is likewise income-tested for eligibility (with thresholds
varying by state), and within Medicaid there is only nominal or sometimes
income-tiered cost-sharing. 129 Congress has also provided that Medicaid benefits
can be used towards Medicare cost-sharing burdens, thus implicitly creating SCS
within Medicare for “dual-eligibles” who are enrolled in both programs. 130 Some
state “safety net” programs impose scaled cost-sharing burdens. 131 The drug
benefit in Medicare Part D also uses an income and wealth test to limit costsharing burdens for the poorest enrollees. 132 The Veterans Administration waives
127. Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Health Care Crisis and What to Do About It, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, Mar. 23, 2006, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2006/mar/23/the-healthcare-crisis-and-what-to-do-about-it/.
128. See, e.g., Nadeem Esmail, Health Care Lessons from Japan, FRASER INST., at iv (Apr.
2013),
http://www.fraserinstitute.org/uploadedFiles/fraser-ca/Content/research-news/research
/publications/health-care-lessons-from-japan.pdf (“All health services in Japan are subject to a
uniform 30% co-insurance rate . . . [but t]hose in a state of low income . . . receive subsidies for
cost sharing or are exempted.”); Alessandra Lo Scalzo et al., Italy: Health System Review, 11
HEALTH SYS. IN TRANSITION 1, no. 6, 2009, at i, xxi (describing how in Italy, “[c]ost-sharing
exemptions exist for various groups, including . . . people over 65 years of age with gross
household income less than €36 152 per annum . . . .”); Philipa Mladovsky et al., Health Policy
Responses to the Financial Crisis in Europe, WHO 17, 39 (Policy Summary No. 5, 2012),
http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/170865/e96643.pdf (discussing Austria’s cap
on prescription fees for low-income individuals).
129. See Cost Sharing Out of Pocket Costs, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov
/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Cost-Sharing/Cost-Sharing-Out-of-PocketCosts.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2014).
130. For an overview of these programs, see Medicare Savings Programs, MEDICAID.GOV,
http://www.medicare.gov/your-medicare-costs/help-paying-costs/medicare-savings-program
/medicare-savings-programs.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). Similarly, some states pay
deductibles for qualified (low-income) Medicare beneficiaries. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(E)
(2006); New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Perales, 954 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1992)
(discussing that provision).
131. See, e.g., Mark Hall, The Costs and Adequacy of Safety Net Access for the Uninsured,
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 4 (June 2010), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports
/reports/2010/rwjf61566 (showing required copayments for hospital inpatient care ranging from
$22 at 40% of the federal poverty level to $945 at 250% of the federal poverty level).
132. See Mark V. Pauly, Means-Testing in Medicare, 33 HEALTH AFF. 546, 547 (2004) (“For
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copays for the poorest beneficiaries. 133
Today, the Affordable Care Act’s health insurance exchanges include caps
on cost-sharing burdens for individuals who buy insurance therein. These caps
reduce OOP liability by two thirds, one half, or one third for poorer
individuals. 134 The ACA further requires that the actuarial value of plans be
increased for poorer individuals, so that the insurer bears more of the risk than
they otherwise would. 135
The income scaling for cost-sharing in the current federal programs only
operates on the lower end of the income spectrum, enhancing the risk protection
goal for those well below median income (and even in that direction, it is
questionable whether these reforms go far enough). 136 These policies do not
apply to employers in the large group market where most non-elderly Americans
are insured, the focus of this Article. 137 Nonetheless, these precedents of income
scaling being widely used in government programs, along with the evidence of it
being implemented by some extant employers, provide evidence that SCS is
feasible.

those with incomes below 135 percent of the federal poverty level and with low wealth . . . cost
sharing would be limited to no more than $5 per prescription. The subsidy and the reduced cost
sharing adjust on a sliding scale, phasing out at an upper limit of 150 percent of poverty.”).
133. See 38 C.F.R. § 17.110(c)(3) (2013); id. § 17.108(d)(10) (incorporating 38 U.S.C. § 1722
(2006)).
134. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071(c)(1)(A) (West 2014); see generally Chandler, supra note 115, at
345–46 (discussing these provisions).
135. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18071(c)(1)(C)(2) (West 2014).
136. Saloner & Daniels, supra note 87, at 822 (“[E]ven with the protections from the
exchanges, such families would be spending a large portion of their limited income on medical
spending . . . .”).
137. See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also David Gamage, Perverse Incentives
Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms are Needed to
Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 672 (2012)
(describing “the mismatch that the ACA will create between the tax subsidies available for
employer sponsored health insurance and those available for the health insurance purchased by
individuals. . . . [T]he ACA maintains . . . tax benefits for employer-sponsored health insurance
(which primarily benefit higher-income taxpayers), whereas the new tax subsidies that the ACA
will create for health insurance purchased by individuals will primarily benefit lower-income
taxpayers.”).
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TABLE 1: THE ASYMMETRIC IMPACT OF SCALING OUT-OF-POCKET (OOP)
MAXIMUMS ON TOTAL HEALTH SPENDING THRESHOLDS FOR FULL
INSURANCE (ZONE 3) BASED ON 6% OF HOUSEHOLD MEAN INCOME FOR
EACH INCOME QUINTILE 138
Quintile
Mean
Income
$11,000
$30,000
$51,000
$82,000
$182,000
Averages

Current
OOP
Cap
$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$3,000
$3,000

SCS
OOP
Cap
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$5,000
$11,000
$4,400

Change
in OOP
Cap
-$2,000
-$1,000
$0
+$2,000
+$8,000
+$1,400

Current
Zone 3
Threshold
$12,000
$12,000
$12,000
$12,000
$12,000
$12,000

SCS
Zone 3
Threshold
$1,000
$7,000
$12,000
$23,000
$57,000
$20,000

Change in
Zone 3
Thresholds
-$11,000
-$5,000
$0
+$11,000
+$45,000
+8,000

C. Rationality for Employers
This Part considers whether SCS might be a rational way for profit-seeking
employers to provide health insurance. Some have argued that corporate
managers are sometimes permitted to “sacrifice corporate profits” when it is in
the public interest. 139 Arguably, no such sacrifice is necessary for employers to
adopt scaling of cost-sharing, as SCS is likely to reduce overall insurance outlays
(and thus reduce premiums paid by employers) even if it does not change
consumption behavior. SCS may also change employee consumption behavior in
ways that reduce costs to the insurer and the employer, though there are empirical
questions about that effect. SCS may additionally improve worker productivity
and the perceived value of the health insurance benefit to workers.
To illustrate these effects, this Part specifies a particular way in which SCS
could be implemented. For the sake of simplicity, it assumes that an employer
offers only one health insurance plan, but wishes to implement scaling therein.
In principle, all three of the cost-sharing zones could be scaled. 140 At the
threshold between Zones 1 and 2 (no insurance and some insurance), annual
deductibles could be multiplied by a wage ratio so that higher-paid individuals
remain in the no-insurance zone longer than poorer individuals. In Zone 2, the
amounts of copays and coinsurance could likewise be scaled so that a poorer
individual would pay $50 or 10% for a doctor’s visit, while a higher-paid
138. Quintile means from DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 39. Zone 3 threshold assumes
$1,000 deductible that counts towards OOP cap, and 18% copay, as in notes 36–37, supra. All
figures rounded to nearest $1,000 before calculations.
139. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
733, 743–47 (2005) (arguing that corporate managers have some bounded discretion to “sacrifice
corporate profits” to advance public interest concerns that have a nexus to corporate operations).
140. See supra Section I.A for the definition of zones.
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individual would pay $100 or 20%. 141 Scaling could also be implemented at the
Zone 3 threshold (the cap on annual OOP spending) so that poorer individuals
enter full insurance at a lower level of spending than higher-paid individuals.
Suppose that an employer simply chose to scale the Zone 3 threshold, and
did so on a simple proportion of income. If the employer believed that its current
median level of cost-sharing (say $3,000 or 6% of income for the median worker)
was appropriate for those workers, it could use that point as a fulcrum for scaling.
And, for simplicity of illustration, suppose that rather than calculating each
worker’s OOP maximum individually, the employer used tiers by assigning the
cost-sharing level based on the mean income of each quintile and rounding to the
nearest thousand. This is a conservative assumption. 142
Scaling the Zone 3 threshold is the simplest and most compelling way to
communicate the concept of scaled cost-sharing because it represents the
maximum uninsured risk that an individual faces, which obviously should be
related to her ability to bear that risk. Scaling this threshold is impactful for two
reasons. First, small changes in the Zone 3 threshold can have a big impact on
whether an individual has any price sensitivity when making major consumption
decisions, since cost-sharing burdens are typically only a small portion (e.g.,
18%) of total healthcare costs. Recall the well-paid individual that faces a $3,000
OOP maximum and pays an 18% copay, and thus receives full insurance at the
point of $12,111 in total healthcare spending. 143 Adding another $1,000 to the
Zone 3 threshold would keep the patient engaged with a price signal for an
additional $5,556 of health spending that year (the inverse of 18% multiplied by
$1000).
Many firms have a skewed distribution of wages, highly concentrated in
their top employees, 144 not unlike the distribution in the American population at
large, shown in Figure 1. A proportional SCS profile (such as 6% of income) will
therefore tend to increase cost-sharing obligations and reduce insurance costs on
net. As shown in Table 1, for the person earning $82,000 in the middle of the
next income quintile above the median, the 6% SCS would move her $3,000

141. Although more complicated, such a move would likely be feasible, given that healthcare
providers must already check the card or computer system to determine what amount to charge at
the point of service.
142. Because the incomes in each quintile are asymmetrically distributed, a policy of
individual-tailoring, rather than the example of quintile-tiers, would have even greater effect.
143. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text for the discussion of “Ms. Median.”
144. See HARRY J. HOLZER, WHERE ARE ALL THE GOOD JOBS GOING?, 50 fig.2-9 (2011)
(showing that in the middle quintile of firms, the average salary paid to workers at the 90th
percentile was about five times that paid to workers in the 10th percentile). Also, across firms,
“low-wage firms tend to pay a smaller percentage of premium costs and to offer policies with fewer
benefits,” which likely includes higher cost-sharing burdens. Nancy S. Jecker, Can an EmployerBased Health Insurance System Be Just?, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 657, 660 (1993).
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OOP maximum to $5,000, a difference of $2,000 more. The person earning in the
middle of the quintile below the median gets a $1,000 reduction in cost-sharing.
Comparing these two quintiles, we see that SCS creates twice as much new costsharing exposure as it eliminates. Similarly, the comparison between the lowest
and highest quintiles shows that SCS creates four times as much cost-sharing
exposure as it eliminates.
The effect on Zone 3 (full insurance) thresholds is even more dramatic. The
average Zone 3 threshold experienced by workers across all quintiles goes up to
about $20,000 (an increase of 66%) with SCS, due to the skew in wages. This
makes SCS quite consonant with broader economic trends towards consumerdirected healthcare and increasing cost-sharing trends over time. 145 SCS provides
a better way to do what employers are inclined to do anyway.
Even aside from any impact on consumption behavior, this change will
dramatically reduce the amount of health spending that is imposed on the insurer,
as more of it will instead be borne by the highly paid workers out-of-pocket.
Thus, as the insurer is bearing less of the risk, insurance premiums should be
reduced on net. This reform creates a bargaining surplus for the shareholders.
A second reason that Zone 3 is impactful is that nearly two thirds of
healthcare spending occurs at the high end, concentrated among the 10% of
individuals who spend an average of $22,000 in a year. 146 As a primary textbook
in the field explains, “When you think of the problem of health care costs, you
shouldn’t envision visits to the family physician to talk about a sore throat; you
should think about coronary bypass operations, dialysis, and chemotherapy.” 147
Although lots of health spending is incurred by those who are elderly (in
Medicare) or poor (in Medicaid), a similar concentration of spending is also
found in private insurance pools, and among both highly paid and low-paid
workers. 148 By increasing the Zone 3 threshold from $12,000 to $57,000 for the
highest quintile of workers (as shown in Table 1), the SCS reform is uniquely
able to provide a solution to costly spending in this impactful domain.
Reductions in cost-sharing for lower-paid workers will instead impact the domain
of health spending that is less consequential. This suggests that SCS may reduce
145. There may also be competition between insurance pools to increase cost-sharing burdens,
so that higher-risk individuals opt out of pools with higher burdens into those with lower burdens.
See Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 164 (2011).
146. See Cohen & Uberoi, supra note 77, at 8 fig.5 (showing that in private insurance pools,
63% of costs are incurred by the top 10% of spenders, and that they spend $21,939 on average); see
also Cohen & Yu, supra note 8 (providing population-level averages).
147. Krugman & Wells, supra note 127, at 1045; see also Feldstein & Gruber, supra note 116,
at 109 (explaining the impact of their scaling proposal, since it applies in this domain).
148. See Cohen & Uberoi, supra note 77, at 8 fig.5 (discussed supra in note 146); id. at 9 fig.7
(showing similar distributions of highly concentrated spending across income quintiles).
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health spending on net, although such behavioral dynamics are ultimately
empirical questions that can only be asserted tentatively here. 149
There are also empirical questions about the effects of reducing cost-sharing
burdens for lower-paid workers. O’Brien has reviewed “a burgeoning ‘health and
productivity management’ literature [and] argues that the value of health
coverage far exceeds its direct costs to employers.” 150 Recent empirical research
has shown that when cost-sharing burdens are so onerous to lower-paid workers
as to reduce access to healthcare, it reduces their productivity. For example,
Dizioli and Pinheiro found that a worker with health coverage misses on average
52% fewer workdays than an uninsured worker. 151 Other work suggests that
underinsured individuals behave as if they were uninsured. 152 Speaking more
directly to cost-sharing, Gibson, Fendrick, and Chernew found that for a $5
increase in copayment for a pain management drug, the employer may lose $31–
$42 in absence-related costs. 153 Other recent empirical studies suggest that for
poorer and chronically ill beneficiaries, cost-sharing burdens may actually
increase aggregate healthcare spending by causing those with chronic illnesses to
be hospitalized more often, rather than appropriately managing their illnesses. 154
SCS may incidentally address medical literacy and wherewithal. The
consumer-directed healthcare movement has been rightly criticized for depending
on laypersons to make very complicated decisions about whether to accept or
decline healthcare. 155 As it happens, wages are a good (but imperfect) proxy for
education, intelligence, 156 and access to social resources that can support medical
decision making. SCS puts more responsibility for making rationing choices on
those that may have the best wherewithal to perform that role successfully.
New scientific evidence suggests that financial stress actually impedes

149. Swartz, supra note 9, at 10 (“Little is known from recent studies about the impact of
increased patient cost-sharing on total spending.”).
150. Ellen O’Brien, Employers’ Benefits from Workers’ Health Insurance, 81 MILLBANK Q. 5,
7 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
151. See Allan Dizioli & Roberto B. Pinheiro, Health Insurance as a Productive Factor (June
1, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2096415.
152. See supra notes 52–59.
153. Teresa B. Gibson, A. Mark Fendrick & Michael E. Chernew, Cost-Sharing and
Productivity 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18402, 2012).
154. Amitabh Chandra et al., Patient Cost-Sharing and Hospitalization Offsets in the Elderly,
100 AM. ECON. REV. 193 (2010). But see Bikaramjit S. Mann et al., Association Between Drug
Insurance Cost Sharing Strategies and Outcomes in Patients with Chronic Diseases: A Systematic
Review, 9 PLOS ONE e89168, at 1 (2014) (reviewing the literature and finding that “the
association between patient copayments and medication adherence varied across studies, ranging
from no difference to significantly lower adherence, depending on the amount of the copayment.”).
155. See, e.g., Bloche, supra note 52 (raising such a criticism).
156. See Stephen J. Ceci & Wendy M. Williams, Schooling, Intelligence, and Income, 52 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1051 (1997) (finding a high correlation between these three variables).
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cognitive performance, 157 and may thereby undermine poorer patients’ ability to
perform the complicated cost-benefit tradeoffs that are necessary to self-ration in
a domain characterized by scientific uncertainty and value judgments about risk
and reward. Lab experiments with induced financial stress have found substantial
effects, akin to the effects of a full night of sleep deprivation, chronic alcoholism,
or a 13-point decrease in IQ. 158 Thus, SCS may enhance productivity and the
rationality of health spending.
Notwithstanding these suggestions that lower-paid workers may make bad
rationing decisions, other strategies exist to reduce health spending by lower-paid
employees who end up in Zone 3 after surpassing their reduced cost-sharing
limits. In addition to traditional managed care solutions, one possibility is the
“split benefit” concept, which aims to disincentivize expensive, low-value
care. 159
In sum, SCS is unlikely to harm the profits of employers. Instead,
proportional scaling upwards and downwards from the median would actually
reduce insurance costs by allocating more risk overall to workers. This may
reduce healthcare consumption in the aggregate, while nonetheless delivering
greater health value for workers and the firm.
If an employer is particularly averse to the risk that SCS may backfire and
actually increase health insurance premiums on net, it could tentatively begin to
use SCS by only scaling upwards. Or, an employer could scale in both directions
from the median, but rather than using a linear scaling (say 6% of wages), the
employer could use an exponential or cubic scaling, or a tiered scaling that
approximates one of those scaling methods. Given the diminishing marginal
utility of money, an employee earning $200,000 per year can probably bear much
more than 6% of that income in health expenditure risk. 160 A related method
would be to exempt an initial amount of wages paid (say $25,000) and then
impose a larger linear scaling thereafter (say 12% of income). That mode may
retain a sense of fairness and simplicity, while again allowing a more aggressive
upward scaling. Thus, it seems indisputable that SCS can be implemented in a
way that reduces aggregate health spending, which in turn serves the interests of
shareholders.

157. Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCIENCE 976 (2013).
158. Id. at 980.
159. See generally Robertson, supra note 76 (proposing that insurers could pay a small portion
of the insurance benefit directly to beneficiaries, which would thus create an opportunity cost for
consumption of healthcare services; if beneficiaries decline to consume, the insurer saves the
remainder of the insurance benefit, which otherwise would have been paid to the provider, as under
the status quo).
160. Such a modification of the proposal begins to seem complicated, but the progressive tiers
in the tax code provide precedent.
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III. THE OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM
One may well ask: if SCS is really such a good idea, why aren’t rational
employers already using it? One potential explanation is that only within the last
decade have healthcare providers and insurers been linked by information
technology systems that would allow insurers to customize the cost-sharing
burdens for each individual patient (or tier of patients), as SCS requires. 161 Still,
in the 1970s, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment proved the feasibility of
scaling, and some firms were using it in the 1980s.162 So, while SCS is clearly
possible, there are four sets of market failures and legal problems: (a) legal
proscriptions, business practices, and cognitive limits that make the employersponsored market unlike an individual market for health insurance, where
individuals would choose their cost-sharing levels; (b) the per capita caps on
cost-sharing in the essential coverage provisions of the Affordable Care Act; (c)
the agency and collective action problems under a distorting tax code; and (d) an
anti-discrimination provision in employee benefits law. Closer analysis reveals
that the problems can be solved, and that the anti-discrimination provision
actually provides a lever for policymakers to mandate scaling under current law.
A. Difficulties with Individual Choice
If SCS is a more efficient form of insurance, why are employees not simply
choosing health insurance plans that provide the appropriate level of costsharing? If lower-paid employees selected plans with lower cost-sharing burdens,
a firm could approximate SCS across multiple plans. The experience with the
minority of employers that have offered high-deductible health plans (HDHPs)
alongside normal health plans has been promising in this regard. 163 The HDHPs
have disproportionately tended to attract the higher-paid employees. 164
There are several impediments to achieving the efficient matching of costsharing levels to beneficiaries through self-selection. The most fundamental

161. See generally Paul Starr, Smart Technology, Stunted Policy: Developing Health
Information Networks, 16 HEALTH AFF. 91, 92 (1997) (“While individual enterprises are building
information networks, community networks serving public purposes have lagged. An information
revolution in health care is the making, but the hope that it will allow consumers and providers to
make smarter choices is still far from being realized.”).
162. See supra text accompanying note 123.
163. As of 2012, about a third (31%) of firms offered HDHPs. Employer Health Benefits
2012, supra note 6, at 63.
164. See Melinda B. Buntin et al., Consumer-Directed Health Care: Early Evidence About
Effects on Cost and Quality, 25 HEALTH AFF. w516, w519 (2006) (reviewing the earlier literature
and finding that the participants in high-deductible plans “have higher incomes than those in other
plans”).
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problem with any choice-based mechanism for insurance is adverse selection. 165
The evidence already shows that the sickest employees tend to prefer the plans
with the lowest cost-sharing burdens. 166 One of the advantages of employerbased insurance is that it operates within a pool of individuals clustered for nonhealth reasons. An attempt to instead cause each individual to select more or less
insurance based on their private information about their own health needs defeats
this purpose, “subdivid[ing] the population into discrete risk categories, which
may adversely affect the future stability of the insurance plan options.” 167
Second, accordingly, “companies have long stressed that [employersponsored insurance] is a group benefit, and even self-insured firms are loathe
[sic] to break the grouping bonds by setting employee shares of premiums that
are highly tailored to individual workers’ characteristics.” 168 Part of the problem
is epistemic. It is very difficult for the insurer to make an individualized
assessment of risk and, by extension, actuarial cost. 169 The law reinforces this
norm, prohibiting individual risk rating according to each individual’s health. 170
These norms make employer-sponsored health insurance different from car
insurance, which is individually rated and allows consumers to choose their own
cost-sharing profiles. 171 Instead, large group insurance plans are priced
165. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 15 (1986).
166. See Buntin et al., supra note 164, at w519 (“Those in CDHC also appear to be in
somewhat better health.”); James M. Naessens et al., Effect of Premium, Copayments, and Health
Status on the Choice of Health Plans, 46 MED. CARE 1033 (2008) (finding that co-morbidities were
associated with choice of high-premium, low-cost-sharing plans); Wynand P.M.M. Van de Ven &
Bernard M.S. Van Praag, The Demand for Deductibles in Private Health Insurance, 17 J.
ECONOMETRICS 229 (1981) (finding that adverse selection on health was a stronger determinant of
plan choice than income).
167. Naessens et al., supra note 166, at 1033.
168. Swartz, supra note 4, at 113 n.5; see also Havighurst & Richman, supra note 95, at 45
(describing the “heroic” assumptions that would be required for employers to adjust wages based
on the cost of insuring each individual); O’Brien, supra note 150, at 12 (similar).
169. See Daniel Halperin, Comment by Daniel Halperin, in USING TAXES TO REFORM HEALTH
INSURANCE: PITFALLS AND PROMISES 57, 57 (Henry J. Aaron & Leonard E. Burman eds., 2008)
(explaining that the original IRS decision to exempt health insurance from taxable wages was made
in part because the IRS “felt that it was difficult to allocate the costs of health insurance to
individual employees”).
170. See infra Section III.D (discussing anti-discrimination provisions). See in particular 29
U.S.C.A. § 1182(b)(1) (West 2014) (“A group health plan . . . may not require any individual . . . to
pay a premium or contribution which is greater than such premium or contribution for a similarly
situated individual enrolled in the plan on the basis of any health status-related factor . . . .”).
171. Even in these domains, achievement of scaling through self-selection may be unlikely.
See generally Stephen Brobeck & J. Robert Hunter, Lower-Income Households and the Auto
Insurance Marketplace: Challenges and Opportunities, CONSUMER FED’N AM. (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.consumerfed.org/news/450 (“A variety of sources report that many LMI [low- and
middle-income] households typically purchase only the minimum liability coverage with the
highest possible deductible.”).
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collectively, which is known as “community rating,” and there is little or no
individual choice of plans, much less choices that isolate the cost-sharing
variable. 172 In one third of firms, the employer pays 100% of the premiums. 173
On average, employers pay 82% of the premiums on behalf of their workers. 174
This subsidy undermines the incentive for workers to take on as much risk as
they can bear. SCS should not depend on unraveling this knot.
Third, in order to encourage highly paid workers to choose higher costsharing, firms would have to give them a financial incentive to do so, but this
may be difficult. 175 It may be feasible for a firm to give raises to employees who
took on more risk, but social norms, legal rules, and collective bargaining
agreements may make it infeasible to lower the take-home wages paid to
employees who are already below the median. 176 Thus, an incentive-driven,
choice-based mechanism might be more costly on net.
Fourth, the behavioral economics literature suggests that choice is no
panacea; it may sometimes overwhelm the capacities of decision makers. Prior
work has shown that individuals have difficulty estimating the payments they
will actually bear under health insurance cost-sharing systems. 177 In one study,
“[o]nly 14% of the sample was able to answer correctly 4 multiple choice
questions about the four basic components of traditional health insurance design:
deductibles, copays, coinsurance and maximum out of pocket costs.” 178 In
172. See Hoffman, Oil and Water, supra note 89, at 49 (discussing the long history of
community rating and the concept of risk pooling). There is also some evidence that higher-paid
employees already consume more health care services, which might make individualized pricing
backfire for the higher-paid worker. See Havighurst & Richman, supra note 95, at 42 & n.103;
Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6, at 60 (“Most firms that offer health benefits offer
only one type of health plan (82%) . . . [but] over half (52%) of covered workers are employed in a
firm that offers more than one health plan type.”).
173. Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6, at 88.
174. Id. at 72.
175. See Alain C. Enthoven, The Fortune 500 Model for Health Care: Is Now the Time to
Change?, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 37 (2002); Havighurst & Richman, supra note 95, at 46–
47 (“[I]n the great majority of instances, the employer pays more for those who choose costlier
options—rather than . . . making them pay the full additional cost. . . . [T]hose choosing the cheaper
package are indirectly bearing some of the costs incurred by those who choose (and get) more
costly care.” (footnote omitted)); Herzlinger & Schwartz, supra note 120, at 75 (describing
PepsiCo’s efforts to reform its subsidy to guide patients away from a high-cost plan).
176. See Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199
(1985) (losses are viewed as worse than gains); see also Payers Refine Cost-Sharing Techniques to
Target Patient Behavior, Treatment Choices, supra note 123 (discussing a “20/20 ogre test” where
a firm that imposes onerous cost-sharing on poorer workers may suffer public relations problems);
infra text accompanying note 273.
177. M. Susan Marquis, Consumers’ Knowledge About Their Health Insurance Coverage, 5
HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 65 (1983).
178. George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance, 32 J.
HEALTH ECON. 850, 858 (2013).
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another study, only one third of respondents successfully chose the plan that
would minimize their total costs.179 Individuals are also likely optimistic, and
thus underestimate their risk of experiencing large costs. 180 Individuals tended to
insure against “high-probability low-loss hazards”; they seemed to have a
“disinclination to worry about low-probability hazards,” which may nonetheless
be catastrophic. 181 More particularly, if presented with a full menu of options
with varying premium and cost-sharing levels (which tend to be inversely
related), poorer employees may focus more on the former, since that is the
immediate, definite, and more salient factor. 182 The premium “price is simple to
evaluate, while other characteristics such as deductible and coinsurance are
harder to evaluate and trade off against each other.”183 Here again, SCS should
not depend on heroic improvements in cognitive capacity.
These four reasons may explain why a choice-based system for cost-sharing
levels has not emerged in the group insurance market. They also explain why
insurance designers may rationally prefer to avoid instituting a choice-based
system for cost-sharing burdens. Instead, firms may prefer to simply apply SCS
to whatever plan employees may otherwise have.
Alternatively, if a choice-based mechanism is employed, insurance designers
should consider using default rules or other mechanisms to nudge individuals
towards appropriately scaled policies. One possibility would be to have an
automatic scaling of cost-sharing according to wages, but allow higher-paid
workers to purchase supplemental insurance policies to offset some or all of their
increased cost-sharing burdens. Aside from the primary risk-protection goal of
insurance, there is admittedly luxury value in being able to consume healthcare
without concern for cost. 184 Primary insurers should, nonetheless, require that
such policies be purchased directly from them, so that the primary insurer can
price into those policy premiums the stimulation in consumption that will likely
179. F. Heiss et al., Who Failed to Enroll in Medicare Part D, and Why? Early Results, 25
HEALTH AFF. 344 (2006).
180. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 (1998) (describing this “amazingly robust finding” in social science).
181. Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Economics, Psychology, and Protective Behavior, 68
AM. ECON. REV. 64, 67 (1978).
182. See generally Keith Marzilli Ericson & Amanda Starc, Heuristics and Heterogeneity in
Health Insurance Exchanges: Evidence from the Massachusetts Connector, 102 AM. ECON. REV.
493, 494 (2012) (observing that “approximately 20 percent of enrollees choose the cheapest plan
available to them”).
183. Id. at 494. But see Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care
Affordable? The Value of Choice Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE e81521278 (2013) (finding that
consumers overweight OOP burdens when choosing plans).
184. Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 39, 53 (1980) (comparing insurance purchasing decisions to an all-inclusive resort, like Club
Med).
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occur. 185 Otherwise, supplemental insurance creates a severe externality problem.
For those that are already adequately insured, those supplemental policies should
also not benefit from the tax-preference discussed below, since they do not
primarily serve the purposes of risk protection. 186
B. Caps on Cost-Sharing in the Affordable Care Act
One potential legal impediment to SCS is that the Affordable Care Act
actually limits maximum cost-sharing burdens. The Act provides that, for
individual and small group insurance purchased in the exchanges and for
employer-based group health plans, an “essential health benefits package” must
cover certain sorts of care and “limit cost-sharing for such coverage” in ways
further specified by the tax code. 187 The relevant tax code section pertains to
“high deductible health plans,” which are allowed to have, at most, an annual
maximum of all cost-sharing burdens of $6,250 for individuals and $12,500 for
families. 188 Unlike many other regulations, these federal requirements will apply
even to the self-insured employers, which cover about 60% of American
workers. 189
185. Although Medicare has found it politically infeasible to limit supplemental insurance in
this way, private insurers could presumably use their contracts to do so. See Cabral & Mahoney,
supra note 70 (documenting the demand stimulation in Medicare supplemental insurance policies).
The demand stimulation would depend in part on the form of supplemental insurance. See Jay
Hancock, Health Insurance Industry Touts Supplemental Policies to Cover Medical Costs, WASH.
POST, Feb. 5, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/health-insurance-industrymarkets-supplemental-policies-to-cover-medical-costs/2014/02/05/f57eb606-8d25-11e3-95dd36ff657a4dae_story.html (showing that some supplemental insurance is sold in the form of
indemnities linked to particular diseases; such payments are thus fungible and retain the
opportunity cost function of cost-sharing).
186. See infra Section III.C.
187. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18022(a)(2) (West 2014). The applicability of the cost-sharing
maximums to large employer-sponsored groups has other statutory bases. See Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial Value, and
Accreditation, 77 Fed. Reg. 70644, 70644 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
pts. 147, 155, 156).
188. 26 U.S.C.A. § 223(c)(2) (West 2014); see 45 C.F.R. 156.130(a)(i) (2013); see also
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits,
Actuarial Value, and Accreditation, 78 Fed. Reg. 12834, 12847 (Feb. 25, 2013) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 155, 156) (providing the $6,250 and $12,500 amounts as an illustration for
2013).
189. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 12837 (providing that the cap on cost-sharing maximums will apply
to self-insured plans); Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 145, at 147 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-13). Still, these limitations do not apply to “grandfathered” plans, which are employer-based
plans that predate March 23, 2010, unless the plans change significantly. See Public Health Service
Act § 2707(b), 42 U.S.C.A. §300gg-6(b) (West 2014). It is possible that employers who
implemented SCS could risk losing grandfathered status, since this would increase costs to some
enrollees (while decreasing costs to others). Stephen J. Mogila & Daniel L. Saperstein, The U.S.
Supreme Court Upholds the Health Care Reform Law: What’s Next for Employer-Sponsored
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It is hard to imagine why the ACA needs to protect those in the top quintile,
who earn at least $182,000 per year, from paying $6,250 or more in health
expenditures. Employers may be tempted to challenge this cap in court, but such
a challenge would fail. 190 As Justice Thurgood Marshall once said, “the
Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.” 191
Still, the executive and legislative branches should be loath to apply the law
to reach such a conclusion. Accordingly, a health plan could seek a waiver to
allow SCS. Alternatively, regulators could issue interpretive guidelines to create
a safe harbor for non-enforcement, as long as the cost-sharing maximums were
met for median employees. 192 The statutory text may be helpful in that it refers to
the health “plan” as having a cost-sharing maximum, rather than stipulating that
the highest individual member must have that maximum. 193 Such an executive
interpretation of this text could allow scaling using the median point as a
fulcrum, which would be entitled to deference by the Judiciary. 194
Ultimately, Congress should change this law to explicitly allow cost-sharing
with upwards scaling, as long as insurance performs its functions across the
income spectrum. If Congress did act, it could replace the per-head cap on costsharing with an income-scaled cap. Similarly, the Affordable Care Act already
Group Health Plans?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 871 (2012) (recommending against cost-sharing
hikes). Grandfathered employers could argue that SCS resulted in no change on the aggregate,
however. Regardless, only “about one quarter of organizations remain grandfathered and, of those,
less than half expect to keep their grandfathered status beyond the next two years.” 2013 EmployerSponsored Health Care: ACA’s Impact – Survey Results, INT’L FOUND. EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS 3
(2013) [hereinafter “IFEBP”], http://www.ifebp.org/pdf/research/2103ACAImpactSurvey.pdf.
190. For a case dealing with a similar sort of statute that has a rational basis for one group
(low-paid workers) but not another, see Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 501 (6th
Cir. 2007) (“Although we believe that the State’s justification sweeps too broadly, especially with
reference to the plaintiffs in the present case, we are constrained to conclude that the rationale
articulated in the statute itself satisfies the rational-basis standard.”). See also F.C.C. v. Beach
Commc’ns, Inc. 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (stating the rule).
191. N.Y. State Bd. of Elec. v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting Justice Marshall).
192. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1298 (D. Colo. 2012) (explaining that
the Obama administration “has exempted over 190 million health plan participants and
beneficiaries from the preventive care coverage mandate” of the Affordable Care Act). Although
they raise thorny constitutional and statutory issues (e.g., in the Administrative Procedure Act),
such exercises of executive discretion are exceedingly common. See generally David J. Barron &
Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 273–74 (2013); Frank J.
Thompson & Courtney Burke, Executive Federalism and Medicaid Demonstration Waivers:
Implications for Policy and Democratic Process, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 971 (2007).
193. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 223(c)(2) (West 2014). Furthermore, the cap statute should be read in
light of Congress’s decision to also expand the nondiscrimination rule in health insurance, and the
argument below that a per-capita cap violates that rule. See infra Section III.D.
194. Whether such executive policymaking would be entitled to Chevron, or a lower level of
deference, is reserved for another day. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)
(discussing the applicability of these standards).
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imposes a cap on the employee’s required contribution to premiums at 9.5% of
household income. 195 If, for example, such a national cap on cost-sharing burdens
were set at 6% of each worker’s wages, it would more accurately approximate
individual worker’s abilities to pay compared to a policy in which each firm
scaled on its own median wage (the running example used herein).
One might also ask whether such a ceiling on cost-sharing should be
complemented by a floor as well. As long as employer-sponsored health
insurance continues to be tax-favored (as discussed in Section III.B below), such
a minimum level of cost-sharing (a maximum of exempted insurance) might be
worthwhile, to raise revenues and minimize the distortion that presently exists
under the tax code.
Even without executive or congressional reform, it would be possible for
employers to implement scaling underneath the ACA’s cap. Currently, 32% of
health plans cap maximum OOP burdens at less than $2,000 for individuals, and
another 27% cap at between $2,000 and $3,000. 196 These firms could double or
triple the cost-sharing burdens of their highest-paid workers. Only 2% of plans
are already bumping up against the $6,250 cap. 197 The remaining 98% of those
covered by a cap could implement some scaling, and there is even greater
opportunity for scaling within family coverage. 198
There is also more potential for scaling the size of the deductible at the
threshold between Zone 1 and Zone 2 for the majority of large employers
because the ACA happens to have a gap that does not apply there.199 The ACA
also does not regulate the particular cost-sharing modalities in Zone 2, which
allows insurers to impose higher copays and coinsurance on higher-paid
employees. 200
Ultimately, employers enjoy discretion under current law to use SCS. They
can do much better than they now do.
C. Tax Distortions, Agency, and Collective Action
Agency and collective action problems might also explain why firms have
not yet adopted SCS on their own. Normatively, a firm’s managers are supposed
to be the “agents” of the stockholders, which suggests that they should favor SCS
195. 26 U.S.C.A. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II) (West 2014).
196. Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6, at 127 exhibit 7.31 (“all plans” row).
197. Id. (showing that 2% of plans have out-of-pocket maximums of $6,000 or more).
198. For families, the cap is $12,500, and the common family plans are not twice as high as
the common individual plans. Id.
199. Maximums on the deductible “do not apply to self-insured plans or health insurance
issuers offering health insurance coverage in the large group market.” 77 Fed. Reg. 70646–47
(Nov. 26, 2012).
200. See supra text accompanying note 23 (defining the cost-sharing zones).
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according to the efficiency analysis in Section II.C. 201 However, the managers
responsible for designing the firm’s insurance plan are likely paid more than the
median worker. Thus, the managers may have a personal preference for nonscaled insurance. 202 Even aside from this agency problem, the managers may
simply have greater concern for the cost-sharing burdens faced by the highly
compensated workers because they are more valuable to the firm. 203
This dynamic can be seen in the related context of income-scaled premiums.
One benefits director has explained that “the hardest part . . . is getting upper
management to agree to this system.” 204 Although she does not explicitly identify
an agency problem, she explains that her firm was successful in instituting
income-scaled premiums because the upper-management happened to be
altruistic: “Luckily we have a management team that believes this is the right
thing to do.” 205 Unlike tiered premiums, SCS may reduce the total cost of
insurance by improving productivity and changing consumption behavior.
Accordingly, rational shareholders may be indifferent to tiered premiums while
demanding SCS.
Employers provide insurance to workers in lieu of additional wages. 206 For
each worker, the optimal amount of insurance (versus cost-sharing, the lack of
insurance) is a function of how painful it would be to face an uninsured loss,
compared to the cost of insuring that loss, including the administrative loads and
wasteful aspects of insurance. “In effect, where losses do not do that much harm,
it is more efficient to avoid paying the insurer for administrative expenses to
cover it.” 207 Accordingly, if highly paid workers could be given an actuarially
201. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an
Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003).
202. See Rice & Thorpe, supra note 121, at 25 (“[F]irms’ decisionmakers, who have the
highest incomes, would have the most to lose personally from the implementation of such a
system.”). More generally, scholars have identified a similar bias in “the legal and regulatory
environment of U.S. healthcare [which] has been structured according to the perceptions and
preferences of these same elites.” Havighurst & Richman, supra note 124, at 7.
203. See David Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 27 (2001) (“An employer may care greatly about
conditions that affect its most highly valued employees, but show less consideration for conditions
that disproportionately affect employees who are fungible, or work in a division slated for sale or
closure.”).
204. Medland, supra note 115, at 96 (quoting a director of benefits for the Biltmore
Company).
205. Id. (“Introducing tiered premiums can generate considerable resistance. Higher
compensated employees sometimes argue that it’s inequitable to subsidize lower-paid workers’
health costs . . . . [A benefits broker] explains: . . . ‘They argue that everyone gets the same
vacation and sick time, so why should this be different?’”).
206. O’Brien, supra note 150, at 5 (describing this as the “standard economic theory”). See
also supra note 2 (listing sources that discuss the employer mandate and show the longstanding
practice of employers providing health insurance).
207. Mark V. Pauly, Optimal Health Insurance, 25 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS., 116, 116–
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fair increase in wages to compensate for that risk, they should be happy to split
with their employers the efficiency gain (a bargaining surplus) that comes with
SCS. The problem is that the wage substitution (premium) for insurance is
typically not tailored to individual workers, and we have already reviewed four
reasons why it would be difficult for employers to begin doing so. 208
In addition, for higher-paid workers, the current tax code discourages the
otherwise-rational substitution of increased wages for decreased insurance.
Federal law allows employers to deduct amounts paid for employer-provided
health insurance, and employees are not taxed on the value of the insurance
received. 209 Because the amounts the employer uses to purchase the insurance are
not considered part of “wages,” they are exempt from payroll taxes at both the
employer and employee levels.210 The tax subsidy “gives employers and
employees the joint incentive to choose low-deductible, low-coinsurance health
plans over plans that involve more cost sharing.” 211 Because the tax code is
progressive, charging higher rates for higher levels of income, the effective
subsidy for insurance over wages is more pronounced for higher-paid workers,
ironically giving them even more reason to opt for comprehensive insurance
coverage rather than healthcare consumption through out-of-pocket spending.
This progressivity results in a “scalar distortion,” creating incentives and
imposing costs that are contrary to optimal cost-sharing scaling. Meanwhile, the
federal government spends about $247 billion a year in foregone revenues to
achieve this inefficiency. 212
Over the last few decades, federal law has tried to reduce these distortions by
creating various special accounts, which allow some tax-preferred healthcare
spending. 213 In the 18% of firms that have adopted such policies, well-paid
employees could avoid taxation on the bargaining surplus achieved by SCS by
putting additional wages in tax-preferred accounts. 214 These accounts are not
17 (2000) (describing risk aversion in terms of diminishing marginal utility, but not discussing
heterogeneity of wealth).
208. See supra Section III.A.
209. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 105, 106, 162 (2006) (discussing these provisions); see also Joseph
Bankman et al., Reforming the Tax Preference for Employer Health Insurance, 26 TAX POL. ECON.
43, 43 (2012).
210. 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006). See Bankman, supra note 209, at 43.
211. Bankman, supra note 207, at 44 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 213); see also Martin S. Feldstein,
The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance, 81 J. POL. ECON. 251, 255 (1973) (showing that tax
subsidies of employer-based insurance create overinsurance).
212. See Bankman, supra note 209, at 43 (citing Joint Committee on Taxation).
213. See generally John F. Cogan, R. Glenn Hubbard & Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating Effects
of Tax Preferences on Health Care Spending and Federal Revenues, 21 TAX POL. ECON. 65 (2006)
(discussing these accounts).
214. Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6, at 202 (showing 17% of small firms, 76%
of large firms, and 18% overall offering flexible spending accounts to their workers).
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complete solutions for the tax distortion, however. These special accounts reduce
the perceived fungibility, and sometimes the actual fungibility, of the set-aside
money, thereby undermining its value as compensation and as an opportunity
cost for health spending. 215
The ACA also imposed an excise tax on expensive insurance plans. 216 The
tax comes into effect in 2018, and about 17% of employers are currently
redesigning their health plans to avoid the surcharge. 217 They would do well to
incorporate SCS into their revised benefit plans, since it is likely to reduce
overall insurance costs. 218
Of course, Congress could simply repeal the tax preference for insurance
over OOP spending, which would remove the economic distortion and raise
revenue. 219 A narrower solution to facilitate SCS would be for Congress to make
tax exemption for employer-sponsored health insurance contingent on a scaled
cost-sharing design, thereby incentivizing voluntary reform of plan payment
structures. That reform could be revenue-neutral if employers changed their
behaviors accordingly. As shown below, there may be a way to achieve this
outcome under current law.
Nonetheless, in the short run, adjustments in take-home pay may not offset
adjustments to cost-sharing. Thus, in addition to the agency problem involving
high-paid workers choosing unscaled health plans for the firm, employers who
sought to implement SCS would suffer from a collective action problem. Each
company seeks to recruit the most talented managers and technical experts, and
no employer wants to be the first one to offer a health insurance plan that exposes
the worker to ten times as much risk, as well as exposure to taxable health
spending, as the plans offered by competing firms. This story may explain why
215. See Health Savings Accounts and Other Tax-Favored Health Plans, IRS (Publication No.
969, 2013), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p969.pdf (describing the 20% tax penalty for
withdrawals when not used for qualified medical expenses, and describing how flexible spending
account balances cannot be carried over to subsequent years); Laura A. Tollen et al., Risk
Segmentation Related to the Offering of a Consumer-Directed Health Plan: A Case Study of
Humana Inc., 39 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1167, 1186 (2004) (describing section 125 ﬂexible spending
accounts: “Lack of fungibility may thus have the perverse effect of encouraging greater
consumption of services than would otherwise have taken place.”); see also Chelsea Helion &
Thomas Gilovich, Gift Cards and Mental Accounting: Green-Lighting Hedonic Spending, 27 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING (forthcoming 2014) (finding that “when individuals are given money in
the form of a gift card—even one that they earned themselves—they . . . were more likely to
purchase hedonic items with their gift cards than with [cash].”).
216. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980I (West 2014).
217. IFEBP, supra note 189, at 3.
218. See supra Section II.C.
219. Another overt solution would be for Congress to provide progressive, refundable tax
credits for OOP spending. See Bankman, supra note 209, for such a proposal. That reform would
maintain a preference for health spending over other spending, but would make well-paid workers
indifferent to health spending OOP versus through insurance.
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SCS has not yet been adopted, and may motivate legal intervention in this failing
market.
D. The Anti-Discrimination Mandate
According to leading health economists, “US law requires that the same
health insurance plan be offered by an employer to all employees irrespective of
the amount the employee is paid.” 220 Such a characterization of the law suggests
that using the “amount the employee is paid” to scale cost-sharing burdens could
be illegal. Other leading commentators have made similar claims about federal
law, which insurance designers may interpret to proscribe SCS. 221
I posit that these interpretations are incorrect. Of course, well-paid workers
are not a suspect class like “race, religion, sex, or national origin,” which receive
special protection under the law. 222 Since women and minorities often earn less
than white men, one could not even make the argument that SCS indirectly
discriminates against them. 223 Instead, it would favor them incidentally. The
ACA also prohibits discrimination based on health status. 224 Although sicker
individuals tend to pay more in cost-sharing burdens, this fact has never been
understood to make cost-sharing illegal. Regardless, the point is irrelevant to
wage scaling in particular.
Discrimination in employment benefits based on compensation is
regulated. 225 For health coverage to be non-taxable for self-insured employers,
220. Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 118, at 144.
221. See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 4, at 84 (“[H]ealth insurance is a product that cannot be
purchased in small incremental amounts, and employers cannot set up different combinations of
wages and health benefits among different employees. Current laws require that employers who
offer a fringe benefit must offer the same benefit to all employees; they cannot distinguish among
classes of employees by offering different versions of a benefit to different sets of workers.”); see
also Hoffman, supra note 1, at 1885 (stating that “employers must offer insurance on the same
terms to all employees,” but showing in the footnote that the anti-discrimination rule is limited to
health status).
222. Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v. Norris,
463 U.S. 1073, 1080 (1983). For a review of the many overlapping non-discrimination statutes, see
Peter M. Panken et al., Litigating Claims of Discrimination in Employee Benefits, in ERISA
LITIGATION 453, 460–69 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials: ERISA Litig., 2004). ERISA also
incorporates the HIPAA proscription on discriminating based on health status. See 29 U.S.C. §
1182 (2006).
223. See DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 39, at 5 (gender); id. at 8 (race).
224. See generally Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination
Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159 (2012).
225. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(4) (West 2014) (definition of a qualified pension plan,
requiring that “benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate in favor of highly compensated
employees”). See generally Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Nondiscrimination in Employee Benefits: False
Starts and Future Trends, 52 TENN. L. REV. 167 (1985) (discussing the history and purposes of
these provisions); Joseph Bankman, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: Are Pension Plan Anti-
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“the benefits provided under the plan do not discriminate in favor of participants
who are highly compensated individuals.” 226 The ACA imposed that requirement
on non-self-insured health plans as well. 227 If these employers fail to comply,
they may be sanctioned with excise taxes, civil monetary penalties (of $100 per
day per worker), and civil actions leading to injunctions and equitable relief. 228
The IRS has not yet issued guidance on how this provision will be applied and
has also delayed enforcement. 229
When it does come into effect, will the non-discrimination rule be
problematic for SCS? Analytically, cost-sharing is not an employment benefit; it
is the absence of insurance, which is the benefit. So the question is whether the
discrimination rule would prohibit employers from giving more insurance to
lower-paid workers. 230 Even if that were discrimination, SCS would not be “in
favor of” the highly compensated employees, since they are getting less
insurance. Thus, the anti-discrimination provisions present no impediment to
SCS.

Discrimination Provisions Desirable?, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 790, 828 (1988) (arguing that employeremployee bargaining is likely to reach the optimal distribution between benefits and wages, making
this market intervention inadvisable). Note that Congress had passed in 26 U.S.C. § 89 (1988) more
specific and concrete specifications as to the nondiscrimination rules in the health insurance
context, but then repealed that statute in 1989, leaving the general proscription against
discrimination in employee benefits in place, as shown below. See 135 CONG. REC. H8093-01
(1989) (memo of Robert D. Reischauer, director of the CBO), 1989 WL 188292
(“Nondiscrimination in the provision of employer-provided health coverage remains an important
policy objective and the significant tax expenditures for employer-provided health coverage is
justified only if such coverage does not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees.”).
226. 26 U.S.C.A. § 105(h)(2)(B) (West 2014).
227. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-16 (West 2014) (incorporating the standard at 26 U.S.C.A. §
105(h)(2)(B)); see Gamage, supra note 137, at 698 (discussing these provisions).
228. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-1, 2011-2 I.R.B. 259.
229. See id. at 3 (“Because regulatory guidance is essential to the operation of the statutory
provisions, the [various federal departments] have determined that compliance with § 2716 should
not be required (and thus, sanctions for failure to comply do not apply) until after regulations or
other administrative guidance of general applicability has been issued under § 2716.”); Robert Pear,
Rules for Equal Coverage by Employers Remain Elusive Under Health Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/us/rules-for-equal-coverage-by-employers-remainelusive-under-health-law.html (explaining that no enforcement will be likely until 2015 at the
earliest); Linda Panszszyk, Dump FSA “Use It or Lose It” Rule, Commenters Tell IRS, ASPEN
PUBLISHERS TECHNICAL ANSWERS GRP. (TAG) (Oct. 19, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://healthcarelegislation.blogspot.com/2012/10/dump-fsa-use-it-or-lose-it-rule.html (reporting on comments of
U.S. Department of Treasury attorney-advisor Kevin Knopf at an ABA meeting, discussing IRS
Notice 2011-1).
230. See generally La Fata v. Raytheon Co., 302 F. Supp. 2d 398, 417 (E.D. Pa. 2004), aff’d,
147 F. App’x 258 (3d Cir. 2005) (reviewing definitions of “discrimination” under similar employee
benefits statutes and caselaw applying the concept). In the context of wage-replacement benefits,
scaled benefits are explicitly allowed. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(5)(A) (West 2014) (“[B]enefits
may bear uniform relationship to compensation . . . .”).
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More provocatively, could these anti-discrimination provisions actually
require SCS? Is it possible that health insurance with unscaled cost-sharing is
already illegal as a discriminatory employment benefit? At first blush, this claim
seems dubious because the per-capita insurance benefits are nominally equal for
each beneficiary, and thus facially non-discriminatory.
Still, at the point of healthcare consumption, a cost-sharing burden imposes a
precondition on employees accessing the employment benefit. If the worker
wants her employer to pay for 82% of the costs of her surgery as an employment
benefit, the worker has to be able to pay the 18% coinsurance rate at the point of
consumption. In practical terms, the covered healthcare is the employment
benefit, and without paying that access fee, the lower-paid employee does not get
the benefit. 231 This is to say that when a worker is unable to pay the access fee to
get a treatment, she is effectively uninsured for that treatment, unlike the
wealthier workers who are able to access the treatment.
The point is not merely analytical. Evidence shows that underinsured
individuals behave similarly to those without any insurance at all.232 The
empirical findings that have accumulated over decades bear repeating: “lowincome people in poor health are more likely to suffer adverse health outcomes,
such as increased rates of emergency department (ED) use, hospitalizations,
admission to nursing homes, and death, when increased cost-sharing causes them
to reduce their use of health care . . . .” 233
In this way, a health insurance plan that reduces wages for all workers and
substitutes a benefit that disproportionately goes to wealthy workers is a “reverse
Robin Hood.” 234 As Gregg Bloche explains:
Outpatient diagnostic work-ups, which high cost sharing discourages, often
trigger cascades of care (including hospitalization)—and spending that exceeds
out-of-pocket maxima. Insurance then picks up the bill—more frequently for
those who are able and willing to pay out of pocket for the triggering diagnostic
work-up. . . . [T]hose who are less able and willing to pay out of pocket,
outside the hospital, receive less of the high-cost care that exceeds annual
maxima and is therefore insured in full. These less prosperous policyholders
thus tap the insurance pool to a lesser degree. Yet for employment-based
coverage, at least, all who subscribe to a given plan pay equally into the pool.
The result is a cross-subsidy from the less well-off to the more prosperous via

231. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.105–11 (2013) (“Plan benefits will not satisfy the requirements of this
subparagraph unless all the benefits provided for participants who are highly compensated
individuals are provided for all other participants.”).
232. See supra notes 43–59 and accompanying text (defining and documenting
underinsurance).
233. Swartz, supra note 9, at 12.
234. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (describing the “reverse Robin Hood” effect).
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premiums and payouts from high-deductible plans. 235

This is a “systematic inequity” where “health insurance premiums paid on
behalf of lower-income members go to subsidize the costly consumption habits
of those with higher incomes.” 236
This discrimination is a way to subterfuge supplemental compensation as an
employment benefit for highly compensated workers. When the income is hidden
as a discriminatory benefit, it can escape taxation. The anti-discrimination rule
has always had this purchase of policing abuse of the tax exemption. 237
This argument would arguably be inapplicable to the 10% of firms that
already scale the worker’s contribution to health insurance premiums
progressively, if that scaling is progressive enough to counterbalance the
regressive effects of per-capita burdens at the point of consumption. 238 However,
this Article has shown that scaled cost-sharing would be more efficient than
premium-scaling, since it may also improve productivity and consumption
behavior. 239 More generally, firms might argue that the forgone wages that it uses
to purchase health insurance benefits are somehow proportionate to income, such
that the higher-paid workers actually “pay” more for the benefit. However,
beyond hand-waving and stipulated accounting methods, such an argument
would be difficult to demonstrate empirically, since the counterfactual is
unknown. Worse, the argument might cut too broadly, undermining any
application of the anti-discrimination rule, for healthcare or other employment
benefits.
The discrimination argument would also be inapplicable to an insurance plan
that has such low cost-sharing burdens that even the poorest workers have no
difficulty securing healthcare. The trend over recent years, however, has been to
dramatically increase cost-sharing burdens in order to reduce healthcare spending
and remain competitive. 240 As that trend continues, the anti-discrimination rule
can ensure that additional burdens are distributed at least somewhat equitably.
For firms that fail to scale, ERISA provides a private cause of action for
235. Bloche, supra note 52, at 1322.
236. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 95, at 42. The authors note that “these matters do not
appear to have been specifically studied by others.” Id. at 43. My own search of the literature has
failed to find empirical documentation of this precise effect, specifically disaggregating the
insurer’s spending for workers by income.
237. See Bruce Wolk, Discrimination Rules for Qualified Retirement Plans: Good Intentions
Confront Economic Reality, 70 VA. L. REV. 419, 434 (1984) (“Congress designed the
discrimination rules to ensure that retirement plan benefits will flow to lower paid employees.”).
See generally PETER WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 303–11 (2010).
238. See supra note 115 (listing sources that discuss the scaling of premiums).
239. See supra Section II.C.
240. See Employer Health Benefits 2012, supra note 6, at 5 exhibit F (showing a nearly
tripling in six years of the proportion of firms with an annual deductible over $1,000).
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workers to police such discrimination. 241 Thus, litigation could force employers
to adopt SCS. However, given the novelty of the theory here asserted, the courts
would be more agreeable if the reform were achieved through the prospective use
of IRS notice-and-comment rulemaking. 242
A pragmatic purpose for the IRS to intervene in favor of SCS would be to
rationalize the larger tax code as amended by the ACA. As shown in Section
III.C above, the tax code may be distorting the market, which would otherwise
settle on SCS. Further, David Gamage has compellingly argued that the current
form of the ACA creates a perverse incentive for poorer workers to opt out of
employer-sponsored health insurance (or even out of employment altogether) and
to get the income-scaled subsidies through the exchanges instead. 243 If the IRS
were to use the antidiscrimination power to implement income scaling in
employer-sponsored insurance, those distortions would be muted.
An IRS mandate for SCS would admittedly be a change of course for the
IRS, though it would not be without basis in current regulations. In the
regulations applying the health insurance non-discrimination provision for nonself-insured plans, the IRS has said that,
Not only must a plan not discriminate on its face in providing benefits in favor
of highly compensated individuals, the plan also must not discriminate in favor
of such employees in actual operation. The determination of whether plan
benefits discriminate in operation in favor of highly compensated individuals is
made on the basis of the facts and circumstances of each case. 244

That passage seems to suggest that unscaled preconditions for accessing
employment benefits discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees in
actual operation.
However, the IRS regulation goes on to say that “[a] plan is not considered
discriminatory merely because highly compensated individuals participating in
the plan utilize a broad range of plan benefits to a greater extent than do other
employees participating in the plan.” 245 That passage appears to have never been

241. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA permits a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring a
civil action to enjoin any act or practice that violates ERISA or the terms of the plan, or to obtain
“other appropriate equitable relief” due to an ERISA violation. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2012). See
also I.R.S. Notice 2010-63, 2010-41 I.R.B. 420 (stating that if an insured group health plan fails to
comply with section 2716 of the Public Health Service Act, “the plan is subject to a civil action to
compel it to provide nondiscriminatory benefits”).
242. See Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (distinguishing rules that have
the force of law from mere opinion letters or enforcement guidelines).
243. See Gamage, supra note 137.
244. 26 C.F.R. § 1.105-11(c)(3)(ii) (2013).
245. Id.
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litigated. 246
For other technical aspects of determining whether a health insurance plan is
discriminatory, the IRS has pointed towards the non-discrimination provisions in
the pension plan context, which have benefited from much more litigation and
development. 247 There, just as in the health insurance context, the IRS has long
said that “[t]he law is concerned not only with the form of a plan but also with its
effects in operation.” 248
In particular, the IRS imposes a test to ensure that contributions to 401(k)s
are proportionate to income for all workers. 249 The IRS regulations applying the
antidiscrimination provision for the pension statute also warn that discrimination
can arise in the way “in which income, expenses, gains, or losses are allocated to
accounts under the plan.” 250 One commentator has argued that, under this rule, it
would be “certainly discriminatory” for a plan to impose an investment
management fee to the plan beneficiaries on a per-capita basis. 251 This insight is
equally applicable to the per-capita cost-sharing maximums that are currently
used in health insurance. Similarly, in the pension plan context, it has been
recognized that an employer’s uniform rule for vesting may have the effect of
246. Research reveals only a single private letter ruling that quoted, but did not analyze, that
passage. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-34-129 (May 29, 1981). See also Wiedenbeck, supra note
225, at 221 (discussing the theory that “[i]f average utilization by members of the suspect group is
greater than for other employees, one may conclude that the plan contravenes the applicable
amount nondiscrimination rule”).
247. 26 C.F.R. § 1.105-11(c)(2)(ii) (2013).
248. Id. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (2013). See Lansons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 773, 780 (1978),
aff’d, Lansons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing this provision); see
also id. at 789 (Simpson, J., dissenting) (collecting cases).
249. See 401(k) Plan Fix-It Guide – The Plan Failed the 401(k) ADP and ACP
Nondiscrimination Tests, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/401%28k%29-Plan-Fix-ItGuide---The-plan-failed-the-401%28k%29-ADP-and-ACP-nondiscrimination-tests. (last visited
Sept. 4, 2013).
250. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)(4)-1 (2013).
251. Berglund, supra note 256, at 154 (“[A]llocating the investment management fee on a per
capita basis is certainly discriminatory. The larger account balances will generate more investment
management fees than the smaller account balances, and highly compensated employees are likely
to have the highest account balances. Charging the smaller account balances for a portion of the
investment management fees generated by the larger account balances basically improves the return
of highly compensated employees’ account balance at the expense of the non-highly compensated
employees.”). But see Field Assistance Bulletin 2003-3: Allocation of Expenses in a Defined
Contribution Plan, DEP’T OF LABOR (May 19, 2003), http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/fab_20033.html (suggesting that either a pro rata or per capita allocation may be appropriate, depending on
the circumstances, but not discussing the application of the anti-discrimination rule). For an
argument raising concerns about the discriminatory impact of per capita plan expense allocation,
see Pamela Baker, Payment of Plan Expenses with Plan Assets: What Can You Do, What You Can’t
Do, What You Should Think About, in PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, WELFARE, AND OTHER
COMPENSATION PLANS 757, 776 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials: Pension, Profit-sharing,
Welfare, and Other Compensation Plans, 1993).
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discriminating against lower-paid workers who switch jobs more frequently. 252
Accordingly, although there are difficult line-drawing problems, Congress and
the IRS have provided a safe harbor to prevent firms from exploiting this
background distribution in a way that egregiously discriminated in favor of
highly compensated workers. 253
Facial discrimination is neither necessary nor sufficient for the IRS to find
discrimination. For example, a distinction between salaried and clerical
employees may appear facially discriminatory, but the statute says that
discrimination should not be found “merely because” a plan includes that
distinction. 254 Even there, the IRS has reserved its discretion to find a disparate
impact based on precisely those provisions. 255 The IRS has preserved an ultimate
discretion to examine plans pragmatically based on a finding of discriminatory
impact, regardless of the mechanism. 256 If the IRS were to determine that
unscaled cost-sharing were discriminatory, it would be entitled to substantial
deference by the courts. 257
Admittedly, it is peculiar to suppose that a form of benefits used openly by
employers nationwide for decades could suddenly be found to be a form of
illegal discrimination. 258 Nevertheless, the statute of limitations presents no
impediment because each application of an employer’s discriminatory policy is
itself a violation, regardless of when the policy was enacted.259 The Supreme
252. See Wolk, supra note 237, at 451.
253. See id.
254. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(4)–(5) (2006).
255. 26 C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(3) (2013) (“[S]ection 401(a)(5) specifies certain provisions which
of themselves are not discriminatory. However, this does not mean that a plan containing these
provisions may not be discriminatory in actual operation.”).
256. “What the IRS is basically saying is that, despite all the supposedly objective tests set
forth in the rules, there is still an overriding ‘smell’ test which a plan must satisfy before it will be
considered non-discriminatory.” Brian W. Berglund, The Nuts and Bolts of Discrimination Testing,
in FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 131, 151 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials:
Fundamentals of Emp. Benefits Law, 2004).
257. Loevsky v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1144, 1149 (1971), aff’d, 471 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir.
1973) (holding that an IRS determination as to discriminatory effect should not be set aside unless
it is found to be unreasonable, arbitrary or an abuse of discretion).
258. See Gamage, supra note 137, at 700 (considering and rejecting a similar argument that it
would be discriminatory for employers to construct their health insurance plans in a way that
encourages lower-paid workers to purchase insurance on the individual exchanges instead). Note
that Professor Gamage does not consider the “merely because of” proviso discussed herein.
259. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010); see, e.g., Chin v. Port Auth. of N.Y. &
N.J., 685 F.3d 135, 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying the Lewis holding to find that each time the Port
Authority failed to promote one of the plaintiffs, that plaintiff had 180 days to challenge the
decision); see also Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (explaining
that if any “act contributing to the [hostile work environment] claim occurs within the [statutorily
required] filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a
court for the purposes of determining liability”).

291

YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS

XIV:2 (2014)

Court has rejected the notion that “if an employer adopts an unlawful practice
and no timely charge is brought, it can continue using the practice indefinitely,
with impunity, despite ongoing disparate impact.” 260
In other contexts, courts have been willing to strike down longstanding
practices that were facially neutral, but turned out to have a discriminatory effect
in practice. For example, consider the landmark race discrimination case of Duke
Power v. Griggs. 261 There, the challenged practice was simply “requiring a high
school education or passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a
condition of employment,” which the firm had been doing for more than a
decade. 262 Congress later endorsed the Court’s “disparate impact” theory,
codifying it into statute. 263
ERISA scholars do not typically borrow from the racial discrimination case
law in this way to shed light on highly compensated individual discrimination,
but the analogy is direct. Disparate impact outlaws “employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.” 264 Likewise, this Article has shown that while unscaled cost-sharing
burden is facially neutral, in application it has the effect of predicating the
employment benefit on the worker’s ability to pay. It thus has a disparate impact.
A similar issue of “vertical equity” arises in litigation over school financing,
where it is recognized that a simple funding scheme applied to differently
situated children may wreak inequitable results. 265 At least four state supreme
courts have applied vertical equity concepts in defining their state education
clauses. 266 In one case, the court held that the needs of students from poor
districts required the state to spend more money than it spent on students from
wealthy districts in an effort to ensure that the disadvantaged children can
“compete in, and contribute to, the society entered by the relatively advantaged
children.” 267 Just as in the health insurance, equity is measured by equality of
260. Lewis, 560 U.S. at 216.
261. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
262. Id. at 425.
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (enacting the disparate impact theory).
264. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977), cited with
approval in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993); see also Smith v. City of
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 230 (2005) (extending the “disparate impact” theory to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, after it had previously been limited to racial contexts).
265. See Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 493, 495–96 (1995) (defining the concept).
266. See Preston C. Green, III et al., Achieving Racial Equal Educational Opportunity
Through School Finance Litigation, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 283, 314 (2008).
267. Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985); see Erin E. Buzuvis, “A” for Effort:
Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and
Adequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 683 (2001).
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access.
In both litigation about discriminatory business practices and litigation about
tax avoidance schemes, a primary question is whether a provision serves a bona
fide business purpose. 268 The purpose of health insurance is to guarantee access
and protect against unbearable risk, while the purpose of cost-sharing is to reduce
wasteful spending on low-value healthcare. A flat cost-sharing scheme simply
does not serve these purposes as well as a scaled benefit, since it facilitates
wasteful spending at the top and deters high-value spending at the bottom. 269
Since scaling could be accomplished at the same or less cost to the employer
compared to the current cost-sharing mechanisms (as shown in Section II.C
above), per-capita cost-sharing would seem to lack a bona fide purpose. Per
capita cost-sharing is discrimination.
Firms could move into compliance by scaling cost-sharing downwards for
poorer workers, scaling upwards for wealthier workers, or both. 270 The test would
turn on whether the benefit effectively provides the same value to highly
compensated and other workers.
It is important to note that health insurance benefits are only part of a
worker’s compensation package, and that the IRS does not regulate inequality in
other parts, such as wages. Thus, some firms may attempt to adjust wages at each
level to maintain the same net compensation for each worker as they had prior to
the reform. Alternatively, the change towards SCS may have no effect on wages.
All competing firms in the labor market will be subject to this same mandate, for
both highly paid and other workers, which suggests that the market equilibrium
may not be disrupted. 271 There is also a long-standing norm that employersponsored health insurance is “community rated,” rather than individually
priced. 272 Additionally, there may be a floor to lower-paid worker wages: “A lot
of writing on ERISA suggests that since the nondiscrimination test requires that
the low income participate and since the low income will not accept sufficient
pay cuts, the highly paid have to allocate part of their tax savings to encourage

268. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (allowing employers to rebut disparate impact
claims by showing that a given provision “is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise”); Coltec Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (The “anti-abuse provision applies where
liabilities are assumed principally for tax avoidance purposes or lack a bona fide business
purpose.”).
269. See supra Section II.C.
270. See Bankman, supra note 225, at 830 (“[A]n employer might also meet the requirement
of proportionality by reducing the benefits of the highly compensated.”).
271. See Halperin, supra note 169, at 59 (“If provision of health insurance results in a wage
cut by either the pretax cost of health insurance or the cost plus the tax savings, it is not clear whose
wages are cut.”).
272. See supra Section III.A.
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the low paid to be part of the plan.” 273 In that case, the net effect of SCS will be
to reduce overall income inequality.
Still, it bears emphasis that my interpretation of the non-discrimination rule
under current law does not provide a warrant for the IRS to implement an ideally
progressive version of SCS. At most, it can correct cases where cost-sharing
burdens are so high that they present a barrier to lower-paid workers,
undermining the purposes of health insurance. There is no mandate under the tax
code for requiring progressive redistribution in employee benefits. Instead, if
Congress seeks greater progressivity, it should adjust marginal tax rates, once it
appears that insurance is achieving its purposes of securing access and protecting
against risk. 274
Ultimately, it is clear that current federal law allows SCS. Further, there is a
clear basis for holding that the law, and the IRS regulations interpreting that law,
actually prohibit unscaled cost-sharing as an impermissible discrimination in
favor of highly compensated workers.
CONCLUSIONS
Health insurance can be reformed so it better serves its purposes and
accomplishes its normative mandate to protect beneficiaries from unbearable
risks and guarantee their access to needed care. By refining the price signal for
healthcare, SCS should provide better incentives to consumers, producers, and
providers in the healthcare market, making the market more efficient. Scaling
will allow patients to make more rational tradeoffs between health spending and
other spending, improving the efficiency of the larger economy.
Still, discomfort with cost-sharing, as a market-based solution to the
escalation of healthcare costs, will persist. 275 Reasonable people can disagree
about whether cost-sharing is the optimal way to make healthcare consumption
decisions, but if cost-sharing is utilized, it should be scaled according to income.
This Article has suggested that there is a remarkably timely and easy legal
mechanism to bring about this change for the 168 million people that get their
insurance from their employers. The IRS should use its current authority under
273. Halperin, supra note 169, at 59; see also Daniel I. Halperin, Special Tax Treatment for
Employer-Based Retirement Programs: Is It “Still” Viable as a Means of Increasing Retirement
Income? Should It Continue?, 49 TAX L. REV. 1, 14 (1993) (describing this dynamic in greater
detail); Wolk, supra note 237, at 429–34 (same).
274. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the
Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994) (suggesting that
redistributional choices should be made overtly in the tax code).
275. See Bruce Vladeck, The Market v. Regulation: The Case for Regulation, 59 MILBANK Q.
209, 211 (1981) (“Consumers . . . don’t wish to be forced to make rational trade-offs when they are
confronted with medical care consumption decisions. . . . As a society, we may be prepared to pay a
substantial economic premium to insulate people from having to make such decisions.”).
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the anti-discrimination provisions of the tax code to eliminate this disparate
impact on poorer workers and reduce the distortion caused by the tax preference
for insurance over out-of-pocket spending. With little more than the stroke of a
pen, the executive branch can eliminate the current distortions that lead to
inefficiency and injustice.
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